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Treble Damages and the Indirect Purchaser Problem:
Considerations for a Congressional Overturning of
Illinois Brick
The calculation of damages in a treble damage action brought
pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act to redress an injury resulting from
a violation of the antitrust laws causes the federal courts considerable
difficulty. Prior to 1977, one of the most litigated issues had been whether
any purchaser in a chain of manufacture or distribution not in privity with
an alleged violator of the antitrust laws should be permitted to attempt to
demonstrate that the overcharge resulting from the alleged violator's act
was passed through the chain to that purchaser. The validity of this
"offensive pass-on" theory was especially questioned after the United
States Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.' In Hanover Shoe, the defendant manufactur-
er attempted to avoid liability to a direct purchaser by utilizing the pass-on
theory in a defensive manner, arguing that the direct purchaser had passed
on the overcharge to purchasers farther down the chain; the Supreme
Court rejected the "defensive pass-on" theory as a matter of law. Nine
years later, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,2 the Supreme Court completed
the circle and rejected the "offensive pass-on" theory when it construed the
"injury" requirement in section 4 to preclude from maintaining an action
those persons who had not dealt directly with a violator. The Court
reasoned that litigation by purchasers throughout the chain would retard
antitrust enforcement by injecting complicated damages issues into the
section 4 action as well as by creating a serious risk that defendants would
be subject to liability to one or more plaintiffs in a chain for the same
overcharge.
Congressional criticism of Illinois Brick was swift;3 bills to overturn
the result were introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives within weeks after the decision.4 Since then, the House Subcommit-
tee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, the House Committee on the
Judiciary, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, and the
1. 392 U.S. 389 (1968).
2. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3. The decision was attacked by Senator Edward Kennedy and Congressman Peter H. Rodino
the day after it was announced. Wal St. J., June 10, 1977, at 16, coL 1.
4. S. 1874, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), and H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess (1977), were
introduced on July 15, 1977. See note 53 infra.
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Senate Committee on the Judiciary have struggled to achieve a workable
legislative resolution of the problems that constrained the Supreme Court
from recognizing an indirect purchaser action.
This Note will articulate the principal areas of disagreement between
the proponents and opponents of the Illinois Brick decision and will
suggest how the major difficulties articulated by the Supreme Court
majority can be resolved legislatively. Preliminarily, this Note will
examine the concept of antitrust standing as well as analyze the standard of
proof required to demonstrate injury under section 4. It will also
demonstrate that the compensatory and deterrent functions of the treble
damages provision would be enhanced by a rule providing judicial access
to indirectly injured purchasers. Next, this Note will discuss the practical
problems of drafting legislation to solve the concerns expressed by the
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick. It will stress that the Congress must
carefully consider the ramifications of permitting the indirect purchaser
suit and the necessity of creating innovative procedures to answer the
concerns of the Court. The Note will also outline the bills currently in the
Congress and will indicate the extent to which they resolve the problems.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Cases
Any congressional consideration of the indirect purchaser problem
must acknowledge the two Supreme Court forays into the area. This Note
begins, therefore, with a review of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shot
Machinery Corp.5 and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.6
1. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.-The
Rejection of Defensive Pass-On
Prior to 1968, the lower federal courts had treated the pass-on issue-
whether asserted defensively to avoid liability to a particular plaintiff or
offensively as a theory of recovery-as a factual matter.7 Hanover Shoe
provided the Supreme Court's first opportunity to examine pass-on. The
question arose in that case as a defense to avoid liability to a direct
purchaser' of an alleged monopolist's product. The defendant contended
that the direct purchaser plaintiff had not been injured by the alleged
violation because of its ability to pass on any overcharge to downstream
purchasers.
5. 392U.S.481 (1968).
6. 431 U.S. 720(1977).
7. See Pollack, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe
Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183 (1968). See, e.g.. Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co.. 252 F.2d 441
(4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), ccrt. denied. 350 U.S. 915 (1955),
8. The plaintiff in Hanover Shoe was actually a lessee of the defendant's products. Throughout
this 15aper, the term "purchaser" will be used to describe the persons in the chain of manufacture or




The plaintiff, Hanover Shoe, was a manufacturer of shoes. It leased
some of its larger machinery9 from the defendant, United Shoe Machinery
Corp. 0 Following a successful government civil suit against United in
1954 for the creation of a monopoly," Hanover Shoe commenced a treble
damage action against United. Hanover Shoe first charged that United's
lease-only policy violated the attempt to monopolize portion of section 2
of the Sherman Act;' 2 Hanover Shoe then claimed that had United sold
rather than leased its machinery, Hanover Shoe would have paid less for
the use of the machinery. United countered that, even assuming liability,
Hanover Shoe had not been injured because it had passed on any
overcharge to the ultimate purchasers of shoes across the United States.
The parties agreed to a separate trial to litigate the pass-on issue, since
it might have been dispositive of the entire action. At that separate trial,
the district court agreed with Hanover Shoe's theory of damages and
rejected United's pass-on defense. The court wrote that a plaintiff
"against whom a tort is committed has his cause of action at the moment
that the tort occurs. . . . Things which happen later and let an injured
plaintiff escape some of the ultimate consequences of the wrong done him
do not inure to the benefit of the defendant."' 3 TheThird Circuit affirmed
the district court's "thoroughly convincing decision.' ' 4 After a long trial
on the merits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a decision penned
by Justice White and joined by six other justices,' 5 the Court affirmed the
earlier holdings of the lower courts and rejected the pass-on defense as a
matter of law. 6 Applying the tort principle that "[tihe general tendency of
9. The defendant utilized a lease-only policy with respect to the more complicated. and hence the
more important, machinery. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258,264
(M.D. Pa. 1965).
10. United had been in existence since 1899. Id. At the time of the trial, it supplied more than
75%' of the nation's demand for shoe machinery; in addition, it retained contacts %vith 90- of all the
shoe factories across the country. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295.297
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
II. Id.
12. The sole support for the plaintiff's substantive theory was the prior decision in favor of the
United States in the civil suit. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) provides that a final judgment or decree in a civil or
criminal proceeding brought by the United States may be used by a private party in its own subsequent
action as prima facie evidence of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
13. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826.829 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1960). cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960).
14. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481. 481 (3d Cir. 1960). cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960).
15. Justice Marshall did not participate. Justice Stewart dissented from the Court's finding that
the illegality of the defendant's lease-only policy had been determined in the government's ci% il action
and therefore did not consider the pass-on issue.
16. 392 U.S. at 494. The Court created an exception whenever the direct purchaser has a pre-
existing "cost-plus" contract with an indirect purchaser. A cost-plus contract entitles the direct
purchaser to receive from the indirect purchaser the price that the direct purchaser itself paid to the
alleged violator ("cost") as well as a profit based on a percentage of that cost ("plus"). The cost-plus
feature insures that any overcharge will be passed on to the indirect purchaser, thus alleviating
the proof difficulties that would otherwise exist. Cf. note 50 infra (discussing the cost-plus exception
to the Supreme Court's rejection of offensive pass-on in Illinois Brick).
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the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step,"'17
Justice White stated that "when a buyer shows that the price paid by him
for materials purchased for use in his business is illegally high and also
shows the amount of the overcharge, he has made out a prima facie case of
injury and damage within the meaning of Section 4." 18
The Court emphasized two reasons for its decision. First, it stressed
the difficulty of proving a pass-on. This difficulty, when coupled with the
likelihood that future defendants would invariably seek to establish the
defense if it were permitted, would further increase the complexity of the
treble damage action.' 9 Second, the Court noted that at least one result of
any recognition of the defense would be that the major burden of enforcing
the antitrust laws would inevitably be placed on an indirect purchaser-
here, the ultimate consumer of the shoes.20  The Court commented that
these indirect purchasers "would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and
little interest in attempting a class action" and that "those who violate the
antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of
their illegality because no one was available who would want to bring suit
against them.'
2. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois- The Rejection
of Offensive Pass- On.
Questions arose after Hanover Shoe about the continued validity of
indirect purchaser suits under section 4. Hanover Shoe presented two
problems for courts faced with the assertion of offensive pass-on theories
by indirect purchasers. Some courts noticed the potential for multiple
liability.22  Under the Hanover Shoe rule the direct purchaser is deemed
for purposes of section 4 to have suffered the entire injury; what result if it
recovers and, subsequently, an indirect purchaser attempts to bring suit for
the same injury? Other courts pointed to the difficulty of demonstrating
the amount of overcharge attributable to the defendant. These courts
asserted that either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law the defendant
17. 392 U.S. at 490 n.8, (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 53 1,
530, 34 (1918) (Per Holmes, J.)).
18. 392 U.S. at 489.
19. Id. at 492-93. One commentator has likened this type of treatment to that generally
associated with determining whether a certain type ofconduct is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and die Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble latages
Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 177,184 (1971).
20. 392 U.S. at 494.
21. Id. The Court's comment reflects the assumption that those shoe buyers had a cause ofaction
in the first instance. As will be seen, this second rationale in Hanover Shoe runs counter to the Court's
decision in Illinois Brick that the indirect purchaser never had a suit at all, sincejudicial recognition in
1977 that § 4 precluded indirect purchasers from bringing actions must, albeit fictionally, mean that the
action never existed at all. Moreover, it contradicts what must have been one of the major concerns in
Illinois Brick-that ultimate consumers everywhere would inundate the federal courts with claims
about overpriced shoes, bread, eggs, and other consumer items. Since no consumers had asserted
claims in Hanover Shoe, however, it may well be that this second argument is merely a makeweight,
applicable only to the factual development in Hanover Shoe, and that attempts to reconcile Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick on this point are fruitless.
22. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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did not "cause" the plaintiff's injury.2 3 Despite these problems, numerous
other courts were more solicitous of the indirect purchaser's action; they
stressed that the congressional purposes for enacting the private treble
damage action had been both to deter violations and to compensate the
victims of violations that did occur.24  These latter courts remained
receptive to the attempts of the antitrust plaintiff to demonstrate the
amount of loss claimed as a proximate result of a violator's conduct;
available procedural mechanisms, they argued, adequately protected the
defendant against any possible risks of multiple liability that existed as a
result of the Hanover Shoe rule.
The eleven defendants in Illinois Brick were manufacturers, sellers,
and distributors of concrete block in the Greater Chicago area. 2' Togeth-
er, they constituted virtually the only source of supply for the product in
that area. In April 1973, the United States indicted the eleven for an
alleged combination and conspiracy to fix the price of concrete block; such
price fixing would be an action in restraint of trade and thus violative of
section 126 of the Sherman Act. Pleas of nolo contendere were entered in
the criminal action. 27  In a companion civil suit brought by the govern-
ment, a consent decree was obtained.28
23. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.. 50 F.R.D.
13 (E.D. Pa. 1970). af'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp..438
F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); City and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo.
1971); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prod. Corp., 1972TRADECA. 74,235(N.D. Cal. 1972):Travis
v. Fairmount Foods Co., 346 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1972); City ofAkron v. Laub Baking Co.. 1972
TRADE CAS. 73,930 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for
Deaconnesses and Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973).
24. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), revudsubnora. Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.
1976) (dictum); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973). cert. deniedsub
noni. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Illinois v. Bristol Myers Co.. 470 F.2d
1276 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dictum); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971). cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 1976-2TRADE C.As. 61,215 (E.D.
Pa. 1976); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 1976-1 TRADE CAs. 60,915 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Inre
Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 1976-1 TRADE CAs. 60,805 (E.D. La. 1976); Carnivale Bagsv. Slide Rite
Mfg. Corp., 1975-1 TRADE CAS. 60,370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bray v. SaferayStores, Inc., 1975-1 TR.DE
CAs. 60.193 (N.D. Cal. 1975); in re Gypsum Cases, 1974-2 TRADE CAS. 75.272 (N.D. Cal. 1974):
Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 1974-2 TRADE CAs. 75.200 (D. Md. 1974):
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 TRADE CAS. 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973). appeal
dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975), Bosches v. General Motors Corp..59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. III. 1973):
Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus., Inc., 1973-1 TRADE CAS. 74,484 (S.D. Fla. 1972); lnre
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972); California v. Frito-Lay. Inc.. 333 F.
Supp. 977 (C.D. Cal. 1971); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 1971 TRADE Cs. 73.625
(D.N.J. 1971); Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 1970 TRADE CAS. 73,033 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
25. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The
Greater Chicago area was defined to include Boone, DeKalb, Grundy, Kankakee, Kendall, LaSalle,
Lake, McHenry, Cook, Kane, DuPage and Will counties in Illinois, Lake and Porter counties in
Indiana, and Kenosha county in Wisconsin. First Amended Complaint, Appendix to Petitioners
Brief for Certiorari at 9, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
26. Section I of the Sherman Act begins: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1(1976).
27. Respondents' Brief on the Merits at 2, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
28. Id.
1978]
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Numerous civil treble damage actions swiftly followed the govern-
ment suits; these actions were brought by masonry contractors,
general contractors, and private builders, as well as the State of Illinois and
700 governmental entities.2 9  The actions by the masonry contractors,
general contractors, and private builders were settled without prejudice to
the actions of the state.30 The public plaintiffs sought to recover an alleged
overcharge in the price of concrete block that had been used in public
buildings purchased by the state.31 The defendants moved for partial
summary judgment based upon "the inadequacy of plaintiff's proof."32
Particularly, they relied upon Hanover Shoe.
The district court rejected the argument that Hanover Shoe itself
mandated dismissal of the indirect purchaser suit.3 3 Mistakenly analyzing
the issue as a problem of standing, however, the district court felt bound by
an earlier Seventh Circuit decision that it read to endorse a restrictive test
that denied standing to ultimate consumers3 4  Thus, the district court
granted partial summaryjudgment under a different theory than that upon
which the defendants had relied. On appeal the Seventh Circuit agreed
with the district court that Hanover Shoe should not be read to preclude
indirect purchaser suits. It disagreed, however, with the district court's
reading of its earlier decision. 35  Relying instead on both the Supreme
Court's test of standing in administrative law, Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,36 and a traditional test of
standing in antitrust, the target area test,37 the Seventh Circuit ruled that
the state had standing.38 It held that the district court had misread the
earlier Seventh Circuit decision:
The error in defendants' reading of Hanover Shoe, Mangano, and Com-
monwealth Edison is that they view the failure to show that antitrust
violations caused plaintiffs' injury as an element of standing. It is not,
Rather, the question is one of fact, and any decision thereon is an adjudica-
tion on the merits.
29. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co. 536 F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976); see Petitioners' Briel for
Certiorari at 3, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The local governmental entitle.
consisted of counties, municipalities, housing authorities, and school districts, Appendix to
Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 16-48. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
30. 536 F.2d at 1164.
31. Id. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 431 (,S, 72(0
(1977). The buildings had been constructed for the state pursuant to contracts awarded on the basis of
competitive bidding to the same contractors who had previously settled.
32. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 4. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 431 US. 720 (1977),
33. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co.. 67 F.R.D. 461.466 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
34. Id. at 467-68 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers M fg, Co,. 315 F,2d 564
(7th Cir. 1963)).
35. 536 F.2d at 1166.
36. 397 U.S. 150(1970).
37. See the discussion on the law of antitrust standing in Section Ill(A) infra,
38. 536 F.2d at 1166-67.
39. Jd. at 1166.
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The Supreme Court reversed, construing the injury requirement of
section 4 to preclude indirect purchasers as a matter of law from maintain-
ing treble damage actions. The Court declined to rest its decision on
standing;40 instead, it found Hanover Shoe controlling:
[W]hatever rule is to be adopted regarding pass-on in antitrust damage
actions, it must apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants . .. [\\9e
decline to abandon the construction given § 4 in Hanover Shoe-that the
overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or
distribution, is the party "injured in his business or property" within the
meaning of the section-in the absence of a convincing demonstration that
the court was wrong in Hanover Shoe to think that the effectiveness of the
antitrust treble damage action would be substantially reduced by adopting a
rule that any party in the chain may sue to recover the fraction of the
overcharge allegedly absorbed by it.
41
The Illinois Brick majority first considered the possibility of a one-
sided application of Hanover Shoe-recognizing indirect purchaser suits
but denying the pass-on defense.42 It rejected this approach, however, as
threatening serious risks of multiple liability.43 The Court feared that a
defendant who had been successfully sued by its direct purchaser would
still face the risk of suit by any number of indirect purchasers in the chain,
none of whom (unless they had previouslyj oined with the direct purchaser)
would be collaterally estopped. 44 Existing procedural mechanisms were
inadequate, the majority felt, to eliminate this risk.45
40. 431 U.S. at 728 n.7. Thus, the Court continued its reluctance to enter the standing area,
See note 86 infra. It is suggested in Section IV(B) infra that the Court could have achieed a more
equitable result had it recognized the usefulness of a standing theory to solsesome of the problems in
pass-on.
41. 431 U.S. at 728-29.
42. This approach had been adopted by those lower courts that allowsed offensi% e pass-on after
Hanover Shoe. See note 24 supra.
43. The majority stated:
Even though an indirect purchaser had already recovered for all or part of an oercharge
passed on to it. the direct purchaser would still recover automatically the full amount of the
overcharge that the indirect purchaser had shown to be passed-on: similarly. followsing an
automatic reco~ery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser. the indirect purchaser
could sue to recoxer the same amount. The risk of duplicative reco% cries created by unequal
application of the Hanover Shoe rule is much more substantial than in the more usual
situation where the defendant is sued in two different lawsuits by plaintiffs asserting
conflicting claims to the same fund. A one-sided application of Ilantover Shoesubstantiall%
increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications- and therefore of unwarranted
multiple liability for the defendant-by presuntg that one plaintiff(the direct purchaser) is
entitled to full recox ery while preventing the defendant from using that presumption against
the other plaintiff. o% erlapping recoveries are certain to result from the tw o law suits unless the
indirect purchaser is unable to establish any pass-on xhatsoever.
431 U.S. at 730-3 1.
44. Two courts indicated that collateral estoppel would apply in such cases. Bosches%. General
Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Il1. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2
TRADE CAS. 74,680 at 94,979 (D. Conn. 1973). Collateral estoppel, however. can only be used against
a party who has had a full and fair chance to litigate the particular issue. Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories. Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation. 402 U.S. 313(1971). Thus. the Illinois Brick
majority is correct.
45. 431 U.S. at 731 n.l 1, 737 n.18. Justice Brennan in dissent felt that an array of available
procedural devices reduced this risk to an acceptable margin. 431 U.S. at 762-64. Other courts and
19781
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The majority next proceeded to consider whether the Hanover Shoe
rule should be abrogated. Even conceding the possibility ofjoining all the
claimants in one suit,46 the Court felt that the result would be to
transform treble-damage actions into massive multi-party litigations involv-
ing many levels of distribution and including large classes of ultimate
consumers remote from the defendant. In treble-damage actions by ultimate
consumers, the overcharge would have to be apportioned among the relevant
wholesalers, retailers, and other middlemen, whose representatives presuma-
bly should be joined. And in suits by direct purchasers or middlemen, the
interests of ultimate consumers are similarly implicated.47
The difficulty that the Court had previously perceived in Hanover Shoe of
proving a defensive pass-on "applies afortiori to the attempt to trace the
effect of the overcharge through each step in the distribution chain from
the direct purchaser to the ultimate consumer., 48 The majority continued:
Under an array of simplifying assumptions, economic theory provides a
precise formula for calculating how the overcharge is distributed between the
overcharged party (passer) and its customers (passees). /f.the market for the
passer's product is perfectly competitive; if the overcharge is imposed equally
on all of the passer's competitors; and ifthe passer maximizes its profits, then
the ratio of the shares of the overcharge borne by passe.- and passer will equal
the ratio of the elasticities of supply and demand in the market for the passer's
product. Even if these assumptions are accepted, there remains a serious
problem of measuring the relevant elasticities-the percentage change in the
quantities of the passer's product demanded and supplied in response to a one
percent change in price ....
More important . . . "in the real economic world rather than an
economist's hypothetical model, the latter's drastic simplifications generally
must be abandoned. Overcharged direct purchasers often sell in imperfectly
competitive markets. They often compete with other sellers that have not
been subject to the overcharge; and their pricing policies often cannot be
explained solely by the convenient assumption of profit maximization. 49
The Supreme Court therefore rejected the offensive pass-on theorysn uti-
lized by the State of Illinois.
commentators have expressed similar opinions. See, e.g.. In re Master Key Antitrust ILitigation.
1973-2 TRADE CAS. 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); McGuire. supra note 19. at 197-98. Signiheantly. no
reported cases appear even remotely to have presented this threat, See Section IV(W)) intra for a
suggested solution to this problem.
46. The majority felt that joinder was compelled by FED. R, Civ. P. 19. which requires the
joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication. 431 U.S. at 737-38.
47. 431 U.S. at 740-41.
48. Id. at 741. The wholesale adaptation of the Hanover Shoe reasoning to a cae involving
offensive pass-on is inappropriate since, unlike the defendant, the plaintiff must prove only that the
illegal activity was a material (and not necessarily the sole) cause of the price increase. See note 97
infra. The Illinois Brick majority, however, saw no meaningful distinction between the quantumn of
proof required of the plaintiff attempting to prove a pass-on to itself and that required of the
defendant who raises pass-on as an affirmative defense to escape liability
49. 431 U.S. at 741-42.
50. The Court apparently agreed that an exception would be made whenever a pre-existing cost-
plus contract was concerned. Cf. note 16 supra (discussing the cost-plus exception to the Supreme
Court's rejection of defensive pass-on in Hanover She). Footnote 16 in the maiority opinion
indicated a further possible exception: "Another situation in which market forces have been super
[Vol, 39:543
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B. The Pending Legislation
The initial versions of S. 1874 and H.R. 11942,51 the two bills to
overturn Illinois Brick,52 were introduced on July 15, 1977.53 Each bill
stated in pertinent part that sections 4, 4A, and 4C(a)(1) of the Clayton Act
would be amended "by inserting 'in fact, directly or indirectly,' immediate-
ly after 'injured.' ,54 The two bills were quickly criticized, even by
opponents of the Illinois Brick decision, for failing to address the concerns
expressed by the Supreme Court.5
By September 1977, the Senate bill had already been significantly
altered to attempt the more comprehensive task of overruling both Illinois
Brick and Hanover Shoe.5 6 The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
seded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is controlled by its
customer."
In Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp., 1978-1 TRADE CAS. 61.934 (3d Cir. 1978). the uholesaler
plaintiff purchased candy directly from the defendant candy manufacturers, who nere also refiners of
the sugar used in the candy. The plaintiffalleged that the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to
fix the price of sugar. the inflated sugar price, the plaintiff further contended, resulted in an illegally
high price for the candy. The defendants argued that the difficulties in determining damages when
indirect purchasers were involved extended to the present situation: Since the cost of the price-fixed
item was only a portion of the cost of the final product, the difficulties of tracing the various
components that contribute to the price of a final product that were noted by the Supreme Court
majority in Illinois Brick, also occurred here. The court rejected the defendants' position. stating that
"to deny recovery in this instance would leave a gaping hole in the administration of theantitrust la,s.
It would allow the price-fixer of a basic commodity to escape the reach of a treble-damage penalts
simply by incorporating the tainted element into another product," 1978-1 IRsnr Cvs.at73,953.
Some commentators anu practitioners have argued that future antitrust plaintfr% wil attempt to
fit xarious factual patterns into the "cost-plus" or the "control-exception. St' Note. Antitrust Lari -
Private Actions: 7he Supreme Court Bars Treble-Damage Suits by hIdirect Purchasers. 56 N.C. L.
REv.341,349(1978). See also 838 AN'TITRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6 'November 10. 1977):
852 ANTITRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-8 (February 23, 1978) (remarks of Daniel Berger). The
analytical confusion that could result indicates that a limited overturning of Illinois Brick. such as that
suggested in Section IV infra, is a preferable solution.
5I. The House bill in the first session of the95th Congress %vas H.R. 8359. it has been replaced in
the second session by H.R. 11942. The Senate bill has retained the same number in both sessions.
52. Both bills currently include provisions that would in addition override the Supreme Court's
decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). The Court in Pfizer held that
foreign go% ernments were persons within the meaning of§ 4 of the Clav ton Act and uere thus entitled
to maintain treble damage actions in United States courts. The issues invol ed in PhIzer. howes er. do
not necessarily involve pass-on and those portions of the anti-Illinois Brick legislation dealing with
Pfizer are not considered in this Note.
53. H.R. REP. No. 95-1397 pt. I 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HotsE
REPORT].
54. S. 1874. 95th Cong.. Ist Sess. §§ 1-3 (1977). reprintedin Fair and Effctaire Enforcenent of
the Antitrust Laws. S. 1874: Hearhgs B fore the Subcon,,. on A4ntitrust and lonopirh of the
[Senate] Commn. otn the Judiciar'-. 95th Cong.. Ist Sess. 205 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings]. H.R. 8359. 95th Cong.. ist Sess. §§ 1-3 (1977), reprinted in Effective Eiforcentent of the
Antitrust Laws: Hearings Before the Subeonum. on Monopolies antd Cotmercial Lair of the [Housel
Commn. on the Judiciarr, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings],
55. House Hearings at 76 (testimony of Phillip Arceda).
56. Sections 3 and 4 of S. 1874 at this point stated:
SEC. 3 (a) Section 4 of the Clayton Act is amended-( i) by inserting"(ar immediately before
"Any"; and (2) by adding at the end thereof the following"(b)" In anyaction undersections4.
4A, or4C of the Clayton Act, the fact that a person or the United States has not dealt directly
with the defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery.
(b) In any action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the defendant shall be entitled to
prove as partial or complete defense to a damage claim, that the plaintiff has passed on to
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Monopoly apparently considered a one-sided rule unfair and dangerous
because of the multiple liability possibilities. This altered version of S.
1874 was subsequently adopted by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly and reported to the full Committee on the Judiciary on
November 4, 1977. 5' The Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported a
substantially similar bill to the Senate on May 25, 1978.58
others, who are themselves entitled to recover under section 4, 4A cr 4C of this Act, some or
all of what would otherwise constitute plaintiff's damage.
SEC. 4 The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any action commenced under sections
4, 4A, or4C(a)(1) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, or 15(c)(a)(l)), which was pending onlune
9, 1977, or filed thereafter. Provided, however, that except in an action pursuant to Section
4C of the Clayton Act nothing herein shall authorize a class action on behalf of natural
persons who have not dealt directly with the defendant.
Reprinted in 831 ANTITRUST & TRADE REcG. REP. (BNA) A-6 (September 22, 1977); 836 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-12, A-13 (October 27, 1977).
Another version circulating at this time, proposed as an alternative to S. 1874 by Senator
Thurmond. would insert after the word "injured" in section 4:
injured in fact, directly in his business, or property by anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws, or injured in fact, indirectly in his business or property by any contract combination or
conspiracy to fix prices.
Section 4A would be similarly amended. Section 4C would be amended to read, in part:
Any attorney general of a state may bring a civil action in the name of such State. s parens
patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such state . . . to sec ure [treble damages] for
injury in fact sustained directly by such natural persons to their business or property by
reason of any violation of the Sherman Act, or indirectly by such natural persons to their
business or property by a reason of any contract, combination or conspiracy to fix prices,
This proposal would also reverse the effect of Hanover Shoe and permit the assertion of a pass-on
defense: "It shall be a defense in any action for damages brought hereunder that overcharges directly
resulting from violations of the Antitrust laws have been passed on to subsequent purchasers in the
chain of distribution." Senate Hearings at 299.
57. S. REP. No. 95-934 pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 33 ('978) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
58. Id. at 31. The bill as finally reported out of committee rcads. in part:
FINDINGS AND PURPOStS
SEC. 2 (a) The Congress finds and declares that-
(I) the antitrust laws are intended to protect the right of consumers to receive the better
products and lower prices that competition produces:
(2) in order to achieve that purpose it is essential that ultimate consumers be able to
recover damages for antitrust violations whether or not they have dealt directly wvith an
antitrust violator:
(3) by depriving consumers who are indirect purchasers the right to sue, the Supreme
Court's decision in Illinois Brick Cotnpanv against Illinois frustrates effective antitrust
enforcement and deprives many consumers of ajust remedy for their ninury:
(4) there are indications that the Courts might construe Illinois 1rihcA Compan" aVgainst
Illinois as depriving producers who are indirect sellers of the right to sue: such construction
would frustrate effective antitrust enforcement and deprive many producers of a intst remedy
for their injury: and
(5) if the first or "direct" purchaser from an antitrust violator is permitted to recover the
entire amount of an overcharge even though he has passed most or all of such overcharge on
to others, that first or "direct" purchaser receives an undeserved vindflall at the expense of
ultimate consumers.
(b) It is the purposeof this Act-
(I) to permit consumers, producers, businesses, and goernments injured by antitrust
violations to recover whether or not they have dealt directly with the antitrust violator,
(2) to minimize windfall recoveries by limiting the recover% of a middleman to the
damage incurred and to minimize recovery by the middleman for damage pa"sed on by tile
middleman to others rightfully entitled to recover on their own behalf:
(3) to make clear that consumer, and the attorneys general of the several States on
behalf of the consumers of their respective States can recover for antitrust violations which
1978] ILLINOIS BRICK
The House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law had
greater difficulties with revisions to its initial version of the Illinois Brick
bill.59  Its final version was submitted to the full Committee on the
Judiciary as a clean bill on April 6, 1978.60 The full Committee then
reported the same bill, set out in the footnote,6' to the House on June 20,
1978.62
injure such consumers whether or not such consumers ha~e dealt directly w ith the antitrust
violator.
(4) to preserve the method of proving and calculating damages pro% ided inScctions4D
and 4E of the Clayton Act for actions pursuant to Section 4C ofsuch Act:
(5) to make clear that producers can recover damages for antitrust siolations irrespec-
tive of whether such producers have dealt directly% \ith the antitrust siolator and
(6) except as made necessary by this Act, to reserve to the courts the applications and
revision of existing principles of remoteness, target area. and proximate causation sshich
hax e been applied to limit the persons who can recover for antitrust % iolations.
CLAYTON AcT ANIENDMEN'TS
SEC. 3. The Clayton Act is amended by inserting immediately after Section 4H the
folloss ing new section:
SEc. 41. (I) In any action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act, the fact that a
person or the United States has not dealt directly with the defendant shall not bar or
otherwise limit recovery.
(2) In any action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the defendant shall be entitled
to prove as partial or complete defense to a damage claim, that the plaintiff has passed on
to others, who are themselves entitled to recover under section 4. 4A. or4C of this Act.
some or all of what would otherwise constitute plaintiff's damage.
APPLIC VInLITY OF AMENDNE'NT
SEc. 4. The amendment made by this Act shall apply to any action commenced under
section 4. 4A. or 4C(a)(l) of the Clayton Act which %%as pending on June 9. 1977. or filed
thereafter.
FOREIGN So% EREIGNS
SE. 5. [The P"z:er amendment]
Reprinted in SENATE REPORT at 35.
59. 846 ANTITRtUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4 (January 12.1978).
60. HotSE REPORT at 30.
61. The bill as finally reported out of committee reads, in part:
SEC. 2. The Cla~ton Act is amended by inserting immediately after Section 4H the
followsing new section:
SEC. 41.(a) Any indirect purchaser in the chain of manufacture, production. or distribu-
tion of goods. or ser% ices shall, upon proofof payment of all or any part ofany oscrcharge for
such goods or ser% ices. be deemed to be injured within the meaning of section 4.4A. or4C of
this Act: Provided, however. That such indirect purchaser may recover damages. only w ith
respect to the amount of the initial overcharge proved to be passed on to him.
(b) Any indirect seller in the chain of manufacture, production, or distribution ofgoods
or sen ices shall, upon proof of receipt of all or any part ofany underpayment forsuch goods
or ser ices. be deemed to be injured within the meaning of section 4. 4A. or 4C of this Act:
Provided. however. That such indirect seller may recover damages only sith respect to the
amount of the initial underpayment proed to be passed on to him.
(c) In any action under section 4 or4A of this Act. any defendant. as a partial or complete
defense against a damage claim, shall be entitled to prose that-
(I) a purchaser in the chain who paid any overcharge passed on all or any part of
such osercharge to another purchaser in such chain; or
(2) a seller in the chain s ho received any underpayment passed on all orany part of
such underpayment to another seller in such chain.
(d)(I) In any class action brought under section 4 of this Act by purchasers or sellers. the
fact of injury and the amount of damages sustained by or passed-on to or by the members of
the class may be pro% en on a class-wide basis. without requiring proof ofsuch matters by each
indis idual member of the class. The percentage oftotal damages atributable to a member of
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II. THE PASS-ON ISSUE
A. The Scope of the Problem
Price fixing and other antitrust violations 63 present special problems
when the affected item passes through a manufacture or distribution
such class shall be the same as the ratio of such member's purchases or sales to the purchases
or sales of the class as a whole.
(2) In any action under section 4C of this Act, the fact of in, ury and the amount of
damages sustained by or passed-on to or by purchasers or sellers may be proven on a class-
wide basis, without requiring proof of such matters with respect to each individual purchaser
or seller. The percentage of total damages attributable to a membr of a class shall be the
same as the ratio of such member's purchases or sales to the purchases or sales of the
class as a whole.
(3) Except as provided in sections4D and 4E of this Act, damag s shall not be assessed in
the aggregate against a defendant but shall be assessed only on behalf of any person who
makes a valid damage claim.
(e)(I) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any damage award in a final
judgment heretofore or hereafter rendered against any defendant in any action tinder section
4. 4A, or 4C of this Act shall be admissible as-
(A) prima facie evidence against any plaintiff and
(B) conclusive evidence against such defendant, in any other action under section4.
4A, or 4C. of this Act brought against such defendant, as to all fully and fairly litigated
matters regarding the amount of damages passed on which would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto.
(2) This subsection shall not apply to consent judgments or dectees.
(f) In any action by purchasers or sellers under section 4 of this Act which is brought or
maintained as a class action, the court, before it approves a settlement of such action, shall, in
the interest of justice. determine what portion of the settlement shall be distributed to the
persons on whose behalf the action was brought or maintained and what portion shall be
distributed to their attorneys, and in making such determinations the court shall act as a
fiduciary for those persons on whose behalf the action was brought or maintained,
(g) In any action under section 4 of this Act-
(I) by. or on behalf of. any purchaser in the chain of manufacture, production, or
distribution of goods or services alleging any overcharge for such goods or services, or
(2) by, or on behalf of. any seller in the chain of manufacture, production, or
distribution of goods or services alleging any underpayment for such goods or services.
the court may in its discretion award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing
defendant upon a finding that such purchaser or seller or his attorney acted in bad faith.
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive persons [sic].
SE('. 3. [The Pfizer amendment].
SEC. 4. Section 1407(h) of title 28, United States Code. is amended by striking ont
"section C4 or'.
SEC. 5. The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any action tinder section 4.
4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act which is pending on the date of enactment of this Act or which is
commenced on or after such date of enactment.
Reprinted in HOUSE REPORT at I.
62. HOUSE REPORT at 30.
63. Although pass-on problems frequently arise in price fixing vio'ations, they may also arise in
connection with other antitrust violations. Tying arrangements are one example. A tie-in occurs
when one party sells a product to another only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a
particular second product from it. This latter product is "tied" to the sale of the first. The question
arises whether indirect purchasers who purchase the tied product have a right of action against the
violator. Another situation presenting pass-on problems occurred in Gas-A-Iron of Ari/ona and
Coinoco v. American Oil Co., 1977-2 TRADE CAS. 61.789 (D. Ari,. 1977). One of the plaintiff
retailers contended in Gas-A-Tron that the defendant refiners' refusal to supply a suflicient quantity of
gasoline to the plaintiffs suppliers had caused it injury. The district court rclued to distinguish
Illinois Brick and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the claim for reltsal to
supply. The Court noted that
[b]y proving the additional amount of gasoline which would have been sold to them by their
suppliers if their suppliers had been sold enough refined products and crude oil, the plaintiffs
could assume that the prices were legal and merely calculate lost profits from lost sales
volume. Nevertheless, the Court would be left with the probl:m of allocation of an
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chain.64 The defendant's unlawful activity sends repercussions down the
chain, with one or more purchasers potentially bearing the brunt of the
illegal overcharge. While at first blush the problem appears to be
relatively clearcut-simply to determine who has absorbed the overcharge
from the illegal conduct-complications develop, primarily because the
features of the particular market can thrust uncertainty into the proof
process.
Only under certain extreme and highly unlikely market conditions
will the direct purchaser either absorb or pass on the entire overcharge.
Only in a completely competitive market in which supply is perfectly
inelastic or demand is perfectly elastic will a direct purchaser bear the full
burden. Conversely, only in a completely competitive market in which
supply is perfectly elastic or demand is perfectly inelastic will a direct
purchaser be able fully to pass on the overcharge to other buyers.65
Ordinarily, the direct purchaser will be able to pass on part of the
overcharge but be forced to absorb part of it itself. A similar result will
generally occur at each succeeding link in the chain. Moreover, even
though a purchaser in the chain has been able to pass on part of the
overcharge, that purchaser may also have lost profits on additional sales
that it could have made but for the higher prices that the defendant's illegal
activity forced it to charge.66 In any suit it might bring, then, it should be
able to recover both for the lost profits on sales it could otherwise have
made as well as for the percentage of the overcharge that it did not pass
on.
67
Judicial difficulties with pass-on cases are compounded by the
existence of different types of manufacture or distribution chains. This
Note distinguishes two types, to be termed "the basic chain" and "the
altered product chain." The basic chain describes a market in which the
violator is the manufacturer or producer of the product in its finished form
increased supply of refined products to plaintiffand the effect on plaintiffs sales volume of
competing in a market ,. here they as well as others had independent and strong suppliers.
The complications in proving damages are similar to the pass-on ofovcrchargesand the
Supreme Court'sstated policy ofavoiding such uncertainties inallocationofdamagesapplies
here as well.
1977-2 TRADE CAS. at 73,246.
64. Note, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing.On. 123 U. PA. L
RE%. 976,978 (1975).
65. Schaefer, Passing on TheorY in Antitrust Treble Danage Actions: An Economic and Legal
Anay -,is. 16 Wxi. \ND M XRY L. Riv. 883.891 (1975).
Elasticity defines the degree to which supply and demand change with each change in price. If the
demand for a product remains constant regardless of the price, the product is demand inelastic.
Effects of an increase are therefore absorbed by the purchaser. Concomitantly, if the demand for a
product changes depending on the price, the product is demand elastic. In that situation, effects ofan
increase are absorbed by the supplier.
66. The determination of lost sales \ ill again depend on the relatise elasticities of the market in
which the purchaser trades.
67. Recoveries in this latter situation will not necessarily be duplicative. While the direct
purchaser may have been able to pass on part of the o ercharge and absorb part. it may also base lost
sales to potential customers v. ho moed into substitute markets in rejection of its higher prices.
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(e.g., an automobile manufacturer). The second type of chain, the altered
product chain, exists when the product undergoes one or more changes as
it passes through the chain. The violator is no longer the manufacturer or
producer of the product in its final form, but is generally either the supplier
of some part that is used by a purchaser to manufacture a different product
(e.g., the supplier of steel for automobiles) or the supplier of machinery or
parts of machinery used to manufacture a product (e.g., the supplier of
special tools used in the manufacture of automobiles). The determination
of damages near the top of the basic chain is easiest. The absence of
numerous changes in the affected product reduces the number of factors
that contribute at each level to an ultimate pricing decision. Judicial
isolation of each factor is thus less difficult than when the product has
approached the terminus of a long basic chain or undergone transforma-
tions and thus entered an altered product chain.65
B. The Inadequac, of the Illinois Brick Solution
The preceding description of the nature of chains, each single type of
which might have two, three, or more links in it, illustrates why the simple
rejection by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick of all indirect purchaser
suits is unacceptable. The influences on the pricing decision at each level
often become so complex that the illegal activity cannot be adequately
identified as the cause of a price increase. Nevertheless, an approach that
fails to distinguish chains for which damages are impossible to compute
from chains that are susceptible to proof of damages unjustifiably denies to
some indirect purchasers a federal forum for relief.
One example of a relatively simple chain is Illinois Brick itself.
There, eleven manufacturers of brick in the Chicago area fixed the prices
of the product to subcontractors who eventually did the cement work for
public buildings for the State of Illinois. Formation of the bids by the
general contractor was typical-each received the various contractors'
bids, marked them in, added them up, and determined its profit
accordingly. Since these eleven manufacturers held a virtual monopoly in
the area, the cost of brick was essentially constant. Overcharges,
therefore, passed through the chain to the ultimate consumer:
Based on the lowest quotation he receives, the contractor includes the
full cost of the concrete block, or masonry subcontract, in his bid as a known
cost. The contractor totals his material, labor, and subcontract costs, then
adds a variable percentage for overhead and profit . . . . The masonry and
general contractors are nothing more than conduits between defendants and
plaintiffs. The contractors absorb none of the illegal overcharges, but
68. For an interesting offshoot of the basic chain. see Philadelphia Hou Auth N. American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.. 50 F.R.D. 13 (ED. Pa. 1970). all'd tub in. Mangano %.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.. 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir, 1971). in which it sas clauned
that the price overcharge on arious types of plumbing fixtures used in the construction ol houses in




recover it completely (and more) from the state of Illinois and its public
agencies.
The cost of concrete block is "known" in advance of bidding; any
increase in this cost has a direct impact on the state of Illinois . . . . While
the final bid will depend on the contractor's estimate of . . . factors rsuch as
his work force, overhead, risk, and competition], the basic fact remains, that
the contractor's bid directly includes the total cost to him of the concrete
block. The only independent pricing decision made by the contractor is how
much markup should be put on the cost for concrete block."
Thus, although the product had undergone a transformation and passed
through several links in a chain, the type of product, the pricing customs in
the trade, the length of the chain, and the area of geographical considera-
tion distinguish the facts of Illinois Brick from the class of cases at which
the Court's decision appears to have been aimed.
Moreover, the factual background of Illinois Brick is not unique.
Prior cases brought by indirect purchaser plaintiffs in positions similar to
the State of Illinois presented the courts with comparable problems of
proof. In Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota,7 North Dakota sought
recovery for overcharges on steel pipes and other items used in building
highways that it contended had been passed on to thein as part of the bid
prices on construction projects. In affirming a recovery by the state, the
court wrote:
With the same price quotation for the product being made to all
contractors bidding on a highway project; with this quotation being used by
the contractors as their cost basis for the product in computing their project
bid; and with the conspirators having knowledge of this bidding reality and
making quotation of their unlawfully-fixed prices on that basis-there could
hardly be much question that such prices, in their margin of artificiality from
lack of competitive play, operated directly to injure the state in increased cost
of its highway projects.7
A case revealing a similar point of view is Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge
and h'on Co. 72  In neither did the court accord any weight to arguments
69. Respondants Brief on the Merits at 20.21. Illinois Brick Co. %. lllinois.431 U.S. 720 (1977).
One of the contractors in the Cenient price fixing cases stated in an affidas it:
I. Each public road construction contract is composed of separate items of work.
Each item ofswork typically is composed of certain materials and labor costs. Certain items
may also ins ole equipment costs.
2. The company uses ass ork sheet to compute the loss est cost to complete each item of
v. ork set forth in the contract. The company, in making its computation. ascertains in regard
to each item. the actual cost. to the extent applicable, of the material. laborand equipment
ins olscd. The cost of those items of work to be cos ered by a subcontract. such as pa% ing. is
ascertained by obtaining bids from one or more subcontractors.
5. The total bid price is arrived at by adding thereto additional amounts for ovcrhead.
contingencies, and profit. These amounts vary from job to job.
In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases. 487 F.2d 191. 195 n.4 (9th Cir. 1973). cen. denied ub non,
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
70. 376 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1967).
71. Id at210.
72. 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
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about the difficulties of proving damages or the potential risks of multiple
liability to which the defendant might be subjected.
The major case rejecting offensive pass-on prior to Illinois Brick is
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp.,7 commonly called Mangano. Yet careful consideration
of Mangano militates against indiscriminately applying its arguments to
all indirect purchaser cases. The proof difficulties that led the Mangano
court to reject offensive pass-on are of a different dimension than the
difficulties that arise in a case such as Illinois Brick 4
The chain of distribution in Mangano was approximately this:
Defendant manufacturers of plumbing fixtures sold to wholesalers, who
sold to plumbing contractors, who sold to builders, who constructed
homes and then sold them to consumers, who themselves might have
resold the homes to any number of other buyers." Commenting on this
market structure, the court in Mangano stated that
there is no assertion here that defendants through their alleged conspiracy,
controlled any market beyond that in which they sold the fixtures to
wholesalers. Instead there is no reason to assume that all of the additional
factors referred to by the Supreme Court in Hanover as influencing a seller's
pricing policies were not involved here. This is particularly evident at the
builder level. For plaintiffs would have the court believe that as the result of
an overcharge of approximately ten to twenty dollars, a builder selling a
twenty, twenty-five, or thirty thousand dollar house raised his price to reflect
this overcharge (assuming such overcharge reached the builder). Such a view
strikes the Court as incredible.76
The court correctly identified the pass-on issue as concerning the inability
to determine damages "[T]he claims of the plaintiffs under consideration
in their capacity as homeowners are blocked by unsurmountable difficul-
ties of proof."'78
The inadequacy of Illinois Brick, therefore, lies in the Court's con-
scious decision not to attempt to separate those cases that unquestionably
present insurmountable difficulties of proof from those in which damages
can be more easily determined.7 9 A resolution of the indirect purchaser
problem is proposed in Section IV of this Note; it acknowledges the
benefits of distinguishing the Illinois Brick class of case from the Mangano
class. In addition to compensating greater numbers of injured persons,
73. 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970). affld sub nor. Mangano %. Amcrican Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp.. 438 F.2d I 187 (3d Cir. 1971).
74. Even the Senate and House Judiciary Committees agree th-it the result in that casw ua;
correct. SENATE REPORT at II, HOUSE REPORT at 18. Both. howsever. diagrce with the reaoning ued
to reach that result.
75. 50 F.R.D. at 19-20.
76. I. at 26.
77. Id. at 20. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text infra.
78. lI. at 26.
79. 431 U.S. at 744.
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the suggested approach would preserve the deterrent function of the
private treble damage action by threatening the potential violator with suit
by many members in the chain. Before outlining this approach, however,
this Note will examine two judicially developed doctrines that are critical
to a resolution of the problems that the Congress faces in drafting pass-on
legislation.
III. SECTION 4: STANDING AND INJURY
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes private civil treble damage
actions to redress violations of the antitrust laws. This grant of
"standing"80 to private parties reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
To recover under this provision the plaintiff must allege and prove (I) a
violation of the antitrust laws by the defendant, (2) an injury to plaintiff's
own business or property, and (3) the necessary causal relation between the
violation and the injury.12 The seeming simplicity of these requirements,
however, is obscured by various judicial impediments; the two most
necessary to a complete understanding of the pass-on issue-standing and
the requirement of injury-are considered in some detail below.
A. Standing
An antitrust violation often has untold effects on distant areas of the
economy; the potential number of "injured" persons may be virtually
endless. The question thus arises whether all persons who meet the
technical requirements of section 4 should be permitted to maintain suit.
The "ripple effect" inherent in any antitrust violation has led the federal
courts to engraft upon the "by reason of" language in section 4 a standing
requirement of legal, in addition to merely factual, cause.83 Derivative
80. In antitrust, standing might conceiably take one of two slightly different meanings. Since§4
creates a cause of action. %xheneer a plaintiff fails to satisfy the criteria in § 4 it lacks standing.
"Standing" is used in this gencral manner in the text aboxe. The federal courts. howeser. hasegone
beyond this first meaning to fashion a doctrine of antitrust standing out of the-by reason of" language
in § 4 in order to limit the statutory action to those parties most directly affected by the violation. See
notes 81-95 and accompanying text infra. For the rest of this Note the term "standing" will be used
in the latter, more restrictive sense.
81. 15 U.S.C.§ 15(1976).
82. The injury and causal relation requirements are together known as the fact of damage. See
note 96 and accompanying text infra.
83. Pollack. 7he "'hijury" and "Causation"' Elements of a Private Treble Antitrust Action. 21
ABA ANTImTRtST SECTION 342. 347-48 (1962). reprinted with additions in 57 Nw. L. REV. 691
(1963).
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injuries that flow from the fact of injury to someone more directly
connected to a violation, as well as other injuries that are incidental to the
impact of the violation, have frequently been denied legal sanction by the
courts. Although there has been virtual unanimity in the belief that some
limitation should be placed on a section 4 action,84 the development of a
coherent law of antitrust standing has eluded the federal judiciary." At
the present time the lower federal courts86 are divided between a strict and
a more liberal approach, as reflected in the so-called direct injury and
target area tests.87
The direct injury test is the stricter test and is in form reminiscent of
common law privity notions, providing standing only to those plaintiffs
who have suffered direct harm from the defendant. 81 The target area test,
on the other hand, focuses on a more comprehensive question: The
plaintiff "must show that he is within that area of the economy which is
endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry."8 9  Unfortunately, these two formulations can lead to disparate
results in practice.90 As a result, a few courts have shunned both tests,
relying instead on a policy-based approach. 9'
84. For a vigorous criticism of this position, see Judge Levet's dissent in Calderone Fntcrprise
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit. 454 F.2d 1292. 1298 (2d Cir. 1971).
85. Handler, The Sift from Substantive to Procethral Innov'tions in Antitrttt Suit. The
Twentr-Third Annual Antitrui.t Review. 71 COLITM. L. RFV. 1.27 (1971).
86. The Supreme Court itself consistently denies certiorari on this point. relusing to give it'.
imprimatur to any of the existing tests. Nevertheless, comments in a rccent decision indicate that the
Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts that the treble damage ac'ion must not be without sonu:
limits. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251. 263 n.14 (1972),
87. The Sixth Circuit has adopted a third test that occasionally re:eives mention in other circuit'.
as well. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.. 521 F.2d 1142(6th Cir. 1975), In ValantutdthSixth Circuit
used the test of standing set forth in Association of Data Processing Serv, Organi/ations. Inc, v,
Camp. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The court noted that the plaintiff"arguably comes within the /one ol
interests protected by the Sherman and Clayton Acts." 521 F.2d at 11 2,
88. This test had its origins in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co,. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir, 1910). one ol the
earliest cases interpreting the treble damage provision, In that case the plaintiff, who was at
stockholder, creditor, and employee of a photographic supply manufacturer, was denied standin' to
challenge the defendant's alleged attempt to monopoliie the photographic industry. Ihe court
stressed that the remedy rested in the corporation: "No conspiracy or combination against him as a
stockholder or creditor is alleged. The injury complained of was directed at the competition. and not
the individual stockholder." Id. at 709,
More recently, the court in Snow Crest Beverages %, Recipe Foods. 147 1-. Supp, 91)7 (1), Na'.'
1956) alluded to this test: "It is well settled that despite its broad language Section4 ol the Cl% ,ton Act
does not give a private cause of action to a person whose losses result only Irom an interruption or
diminution of profitable relationships with the party directly affected by alleged %iolations ol the
antitrust laws." ht at 909.
89. Conference of Studio Unions v. Lowe's. Inc.. 193 F.2d 51.54-55 (9th Cir. 1951). (er. deni d.
342 U.S. 919 (1952).
90.
In a long line of cases courts have found that shareholders. creditor, emplo cc%, lessors,
patent licensors. and suppliers are not deemed to have been injiured u ithin the meaning ol the
statute by infractions having a more immediate impact upon other., At the same tune. other
courts, with respect to several of these categories. have reached opposite conclusion%,
Handler. .'upra note 85. at 24-25.
91. See, e.g., Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 453 F,2d, 51 (3d Cir. 1976).
Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1970), Viewing the conlused state ol
the law in this area, Judge Ely of the Ninth Circuit recently remarked that "[u]nfortunately, no bright
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This confusion in the development and application of an antitrust
standing doctrine may have developed because courts have relied on
standing as an umbrella doctrine for various purposes. " Some courts, for
example, confuse the procedural issue of standing with the substantive
issue of determining whether a violation has occurred.93 Other courts
have utilized a standing doctrine to justify their decisions about pass-on. 94
The result of such tendencies is to obscure these related, although
distinct, issues.
The inquiry for the court at the stage at which standing per se should
be determined is not necessarily whether a party has a valid claim, that is,
whether it can establish the three requirements of section 4, but rather
whether this party, even though it may be able to prove the technical
requirements of section 4, is the proper party to present that claim. The
purpose of the direct injury and the target area tests of antitrust standing is
to pare the number of antitrust claims; the tests were designed to crystallize
into a workable formula criteria that should control this determination.
The issue in the pass-on cases does not necessarily concern the application
of the protective umbrella of standing to control the ripple effect of an
antitrust violation. 95 The greater difficulty has been the extent to which
line has yet emerged to divine this group [entitled to protection by the antitrust lawvs] and courts hase
formulated varied definitions." In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122. 125 (9th Cir.
1973).
92. See. e.g.. House Hearings at 82-83 (testimony of Phillip Areeda). One ofthe dangers of this
confusion is noted by Areeda:
The question of standing is often misunderstood because courts use the standing
terminology' to express two kinds of judgments: (I) Standing may be denied because the
plaintiff is just too "remote" from the transaction to be alloswed to force other people to
litigate about it. The shareholder or perhaps the purchaser of the secondhand house % ould
be examples: (2) standing may also be denied because the court belie% es that the particular
plaintiff or class of plaintiffs cannot, in all probability, establish any damage that makes it
ss orthshile for the suit to take place. The secondhand house buyer is certainlY an example,
The possibility for confusion arises because both refusals to hear a damage suit ma% be
expressed in standing terms. A court might then unthinkingly deny standing for injunctis e
purposes to a plaintiff\s ho could not prove damages adequately for trebledamage purposes.
but who is [not] [sic] too "remote" in the first sense I stated.
93. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the plaintiff bou ling
centers challenged the acquisition by Brunswsick. one of the largest manufacturers of bowling
equipment. of numerous bowlingcenters operafing in the same markets as the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
charged that thevertical integration forward into the retail market afforded Bruns ick the opportunity
to utili7e its "deep pocket" to the competitive disads antage ofthe plaintiffs. They further alleged that.
had Brunswick not acquired them. the bowling centers would hase gone out of business. lea% ing the
plaintiffs a greater share of the market. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that all economic
dislocations resulting from a merger are actionable. The Courtnoted that for the plaintiffto recos er the
injuries must floss from that which makes the merger unlawsful. Finding that the plaintiffs in the
instant case had been "injured" instead by the increased competition in the industr resulting from the
continued existence of the other centers and that Brunss ick had not utiliied its "giant" position, the
Court held for the defendants.
A number of courts confuse the substantive issue in Brunswick with the procedural issue of
standing. For example, these courts state that because a plaintiffhas not proved injury ofthe type that
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, it lacks standing. See. e.g., Southern Concrete Co. v.
United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
94. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
95. Of course, the question might also arise sshether the plaintiff is too "remote" from the
%iolation to hase standing in the proper sense. Under the target area test of antitrust standing.
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damages can accurately be determined. Properly phrased, however,
speculativeness goes to the questions of whether injury as well as the
amount of that injury have been legally demonstrated-that is, whether
the plaintiff has established the technical requirements of section 4.
The distinction between standing and section 4 injury must therefore
be understood and clearly articulated by the Congress so that any
legislation the Congress might pass in the belief that it will permit recovery
by indirect purchasers will not be thwarted in the federal courts by the
misapplication of judicially created standing doctrines. It would be ironic
if the courts continued to deny indirect purchaser suits on standing
grounds despite the passage of anti-Illinois Brick legislation.
B. The Requirement of Injury
The proof of section 4 injury is analytically distinct from the problem
of standing. Assuming that the plaintiff can establish the requisite
violation by the defendant, it must then demonstrate both injury and
causation in fact; this dual requirement is sometimes referred to as the fact
96of damage. For example, although a defendant may have committed
a violation, if the plaintiff suffered no injury there should obviously be no
recovery; similarly, if the plaintiff's damage was "caused" by an event other
than the claimed violation there should be no recovery.97
The most difficult questions, and the questions most directly pertinent
to the pass-on problem, concern the quanta of proof needed to establish
the fact of damage to a particular plaintiff as well as its amount. The
challenge is to reconstruct, to legal satisfaction, what would have hap-
pened in a perfectly competitive market. "The basic economic problem in
a treble-damage suit is to attempt to 'turn back the calendar,' remove the
effects of conspiratorial or other alleged illegal behavior, reconstruct and
record the situation that would have prevailed under the type of competi-
tive conditions that would have existed, absent the conspiracy or other
practices or actions.' 98
however, it would appear that the injuries that the different members in the chain otensily have
suffered could not be characterized as collateral to the main impact: all the members of the chain are
targets of the violation. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
96. Pollack, supra note 83, at 342.
97. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y, 1961), On the other
hand, defendant's conduct need not have been the sole factor leading to plaintill's iniury: it is enough it
defendant's conduct was a material or substantial cause. Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp..
395 F. Supp. 735, 768 (D. Md. 1975). This approach has been approved by the Supreme Court,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969).
98. Lanzillotti. Problems of Proof of Damages in Antitrust Suits.. 16AtITRt'ts lit II ,329.330-
31 (1971) (emphasis in original). The near hopelessness of this task has inspired another writer to
remark:
Trying to figure out, for example, what would have happened over a period of several years to
an industry price level "but for" a price conspiracy might involve numerous variables-
perhaps almost as many as trying to figure out what would have happened in the Civil War if
Grant had not been given command or if the Union had not won at Antietam or Vicksburg.
Because of these numerous variables, the concept ofantitrust "injury" necessarily consists in
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Nevertheless, for the private treble damage action to remain a
deterrent to anticompetitive behavior and an effective compensatory
mechanism, the courts had to develop some standard of proof that would
recognize the difficulties faced by the antitrust plaintiff while remaining
fair to the defendant. Recognizing that the traditional standards of proof
in civil actions could vitiate the treble damage action, the Supreme Court
in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,99 Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,1°° and Bigelow i.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.t' t substantially relaxed the plaintiff's burden
of proof on the amount of damages issue.102
This triumvirate of cases sets up a two-part test. The plaintiff must
first prove the fact of some damage to it under the traditional preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. After it has established the fact of some
damage, the plaintiff is allowed to demonstrate the amount of those
damages under a less exacting standard of proof.10 3  In the earliest of the
three cases, Eastman Kodak, the emerging principle was stated that
"[d]amages are not rendered uncertain because they cannot be calculated
with absolute exactness. It is sufficient if a reasonable basis of computa-
tion is afforded although the result be only approximate."'t 4  This
approach was developed further by Justice Sutherland in Story Parch-
ment:
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there
was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the
measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained
some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable thejury to fix the
amount. The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies
to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which
are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their
amount. 05
large part of hope. projections and the blue sky, and the result is that the line betcen
legitimate and illegitimate claims is sometimes very thin indeed.
Pollack. miqwa note 83. at 344 (emphasis in original).
99. 273 U.S. 359(1927).
100. 282U.S.555(1931).
101. 327 U.S. 251(1946).
102. Note. Private Treble Damage A ntitrust Suits: Measure of Danages for Desirttion ofAll
or Part ofa Business. 80 H \RV. L. REv. 1566. 1572 (1967). The Supreme Court in Storr Parchment.
sketched the policy for this judicial move:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of
damages w ith certainty, it w ould be a perversion of fundamental principles ofjustice to deny
all relief to the injured person. and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from makinganyamend for
his acts .....
' - . -The constant tendency of the courts is to find some way in wshich damages can be
awarded %,here a wrong has been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused
%% ith right of recovery."
282 U.S. at 563. 565-66 (citations omitted).
103. Timberlake. The Legal hljuryi' Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage
Actionms Uter the Antitrust Laws. 30 GEO. W,,ssn L. REV. 231 (1961).
104. 273 U.S. at 379.
105. 282 U.S. at 562.
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Bigelow, the last of the three cases, is the crucial decision in the
development of proof requirements in treble damage actions. In Bigelow
the plaintiff alleged that a discriminatory film distribution release system
had prevented its acquisition of feature films until after those films had
been shown in theatres controlled by the defendants. The plaintiff
asserted two bases for computing damages. First, it compared the
earnings of its own theatre over a certain period of time with the earnings
of a theatre of comparable size controlled by one of the defendants.
Alternatively, it compared its own theatre's earnings over two succeeding
five-year periods. The problem with each alternative was that the
defendants had controlled the market since 1927; there was simply no way
of knowing what the plaintiff's profits would have been in a freely
operating market. 10 6 As Justice Stone phrased the defendants' position,
"petitioners' evidence does not establish the fact of damage,
and . . . further, the standard of comparison which the evidence sets up
is too speculative and uncertain to afford an accurate measure of the
amount of damage."'0 7
Only Justice Frankfurter in dissent recognized the significance of the
defendants' position. After reaffirming the two-part test of Eastman
Kodak and Story Parchment, with its foundation inquiry into whether the
defendants' conduct had caused any damage at all, he chastized the
majority for failing to make that initial determination. "The record
appears devoid of any proof that, if competitive conditions had prevailed,
distributors would not have made rental contracts with their respective
exhibiting affiliates to the serious disadvantage of independents like the
petitioners. They might individually have done so and not have offended
the Sherman Law."' 0 8
The jury, however, returned a verdict for the plaintiff; on review, the
majority in the Supreme Court upheld this verdict on the basis of the
comparisons between the earnings of the two periods. Thus, a jury verdict
based on comparisons between two periods, each of which was contami-
nated by uncompetitive conduct differing only in degree, was allowed to
stand. The majority supported its decision with a statement that the jury
could conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of
defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' business, and
from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits and values, not shown to be
attributed to other causes, that defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage
to the plaintiffs. 0 9
106. 327 U.S. at 260-61. See Clark. The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Dotrin, ol Iatnage'
in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 Mici. L. REv. 363.379 (1954),
107. 327 U.S. at 263.
108. d. at 267 (Frankfurter. J., dissenting).
109. d. at 264.
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The problem with this statement is that on the facts in Bigelow "it cannot
be said that the discrepancy was wholly unexplained except for the fact
that plaintiffs were discriminately deprived of earlier runs."'" t
Bigelow, then, although adhering in word to the two-part test
articulated by the Supreme Court in earlier cases, may have further
liberalized that test by lessening the proof required to meet the first part of
that test."' Bigelow thus illustrates the receptive approach that the
Supreme Court has taken to avoid saddling the antitrust plaintiff with
insurmountable barriers of proof."2  The Supreme Court, by the mid-
1940s, had recognized that for the treble damage action to remain a
credible weapon of antitrust enforcement the courts had to be relatively
solicitous of the antitrust plaintiff's plight." 3  Eastman Kodak, Story
Parchment, and Bigelow should be read to allow the antitrust plaintiff to
proceed with the best available evidence.
This judicial concern for the antitrust plaintiff and concomitant
reluctance to permit the violator to profit from its own wrong characterize
Supreme Court analysis prior to Illinois Brick. Hanover Shoe reinforces
the policies of the earlier cases, despite language from that decision which
seems contradictory:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normal-
ly the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured
after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one
fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic condi-
tions more buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have
chosen a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic
world rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change
in a company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a
different volume of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could beshown
that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the
overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter
declined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrat-
ing that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices
absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been
discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense
110. Clark, supra note 106. at 383. But see Pollack, supra note 83. at 345-46. %%ho reads the
majority opinion as stating that the fact of some damage had been demonstrated: this interpretation
would make Bigelow indistinguishable from Eastman Kodak and Stary Parchment.
111. A fuller discussion of the extremely liberal attitude in B/gelow and the implications of the
decision are developed at some length in Clark, supra note 106.
112. Lower courts, following the import of these decisions, have continued to emphasize this
lesser standard of proof on the damages issue. "A study of the adjudicated cases in this area steadily
dispels any impression that this question of damages is governed by an application of the common-la%
rule of reasonable certainty. The cases have long since departed from this rule in antitrust litigation."
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 386, 391 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
113. A study by Richard Posner noted a dramatic increase in the number of pri% ate suits brought
that roughly coincides with the Bigelow decision. Posner, A Statistical Studi) of Antitrust Enforce-
ment. 13 J. LAW & EcoN. 365, 373 (1970).
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would require a convincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable
figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable.' 14
Reviewing the quoted passage, one commentator remarked that "the
Court's strictures upon pass-on proof must surely be regarded as a truly
extraordinary (although unintentional) indictment of the modern treble
damage remedy, for that is precisely the kind of proof regularly accepted
from plaintiffs in such cases." 15 In other words, is proof of the direct
purchaser's probable prices but for the overcharge necessarily so much
more difficult than proof of the violator's probable prices but for the same
overcharge? The apparent inconsistency, however, can be reconciled
from a policy perspective.' t6 The practical result of Hanover ,hoe was to
insure that there would always be a plaintiff to bring an action against a
violator of the antitrust laws. The Court preferred that the direct
purchaser receive a windfall rather than that the defendant retain the fruits
of its illegal conduct.
Thus, the heavy burden of proof that the Court imposed on the
defendant in Hanover Shoe reflected the Court's continuing belief that
section 4 should not be rendered ineffective by harsh judicial interpreta-
tions. This concern that the dual policies of section 4, deterrence and
compensation, should be carefully guarded places Hanover Shoe in a line
of pro-enforcement decisions. The supposition by the majority in Illinois
Brick, therefore, that an antitrust plaintiff must make an exact and detailed
demonstration of the amount of harm it has suffered 1 7 is precisely the
argument previously rejected in the Eastman Kodak-Story Parchment-
Bigelow-Hanover Shoe line of cases. The application of Hanover Shoe to
Illinois Brick leads to a curious result: arguments previously utilized to
shift the risk of uncertainty over the precise amount of damages onto the
defendant (who, arguably, should bear such risk) have now become a
sword to exclude admittedly injured plaintiffs." 8 Before the plaintiff's
shield in Hanover Shoe becomes the defendant's sword, denying injured
parties access to the courts, the Congress should attempt to resolve the
majority's concerns in Illinois Brick in legislation that would simultane-
ously preserve indirect purchaser actions.
114. 393 U.S. at 492-93. The majority in Illinois Brick itself acknowledged the importance ol
this argument to the decision in Hanover Shoe. 431 U.S. at 732 n.12
115. Pollack, supra note 7, at 1211.
116. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation. 1973-2 TRADE CAS. 1 74.680 at 94. 978 (D, Conti,
1973). See also In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191. 199 (1973): "[In tlanover Shw. tile]
court was applying policy to a specific case."
117. The majority apparently concedes the fact of some injury to the indirect purchaser and tile
issue, therefore, concerns the ability to demonstrate the amount of the injury. 431 U.S. at 735,
118. One clear line of analysis reconciles Illinois Brick with all prior decisions. The Bigclow line
of cases and Hanover Shoe presented the Court with one plaintiff. In dcciding where the risk oferror
in the computation of damages should fall. the Court ruled that when a violator had created the
uncertainty it should not be able to avoid recovery because its conduct had made it diflicult to
reconstruct the market and measure damages with precision. This approach, however, is apparently
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IV. THE PROBLEMS BEFORE THE CONGRESS
A. Direct Purchasers, Indirect Purchasers- Who Will Sue?
The majority and the dissent in Illinois Brick agreed on the necessity
of strong antitrust enforcement and on the fundamental importance of the
treble damage action in the overall statutory scheme.' 9 Their disagree-
ments centered on whether the antitrust laws would be more effectively
enforced by permitting direct purchaser suits unhampered by the possibili-
ty of indirect purchaser intervention or by allowing both direct purchasers
and indirect purchasers to maintain actions. The adequacy of the Con-
gress' resolution of the disagreements will depend to a significant extent
upon its ability to resolve the problems of multiple liability and damage
calculation considered by the Illinois Brick majority and discussed in
Sections B-D of this part oftheNote. A resolution, however, should only
be attempted if the resulting legislation can create a structure that would
encourage the assertion of treble damage actions by those persons or
entities most likely to bring them. The decision whether to overrule
Illinois Brick may therefore ultimately depend upon the Congress' percep-
tion of the past performance of both direct and indirect purchasers in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws.1
20
An examination of some of the developments that occurred in several
unacceptable to the Court when pass-on is utilized as the basis for recovery. In these situations, at least
one plaintiff (the direct purchaser) assumedly is able to bring suit. This plaintiff must. of course. still
prove the fact and the amount ofthe initial overcharge, and any risk of error there created should fall.
as Hanover Shoe and its predecessor decisions teach, on the defendant. But to proceed one step
further and to permit other plaintiffs (the indirect purchasers) to attempt to prove that a portion of that
overcharge properly belongs to them would create entirely new risks of uncertainty. risks that would
fall not on the defendant but on the various plaintiffs to the action. The Court concluded that such an
apportionment would have the pernicious effect of depleting the recoverable fund and thus discourag-
ing the party the Court felt was the most likely plaintiff, the direct purchaser. This result the Court
could not permit.
119. 431 U.S. at 74546, 748-49.
120. The majority in Illinois Brick does not appear to have appreciated the importance of
determining whether direct purchasers had been, or could become, the mainstays of enforcement.
Significantly, Justice White noted:
We recognize that direct purchasers sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damage
suit for fear of disrupting relations with their suppliers. But on balance, and until there are
clear directions from Congress to the contrary, we conclude that the legislative
purpose . . . under § 4 . . . is better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to
the full extent of the overcharge ....
431 U.S. at 746.
The Illinois Brick majority may also have reasoned that a confinement of recovery to the direct
purchaser would encourage settlements. A violator will be more willing to settle with a direct
purchaser if it knows that thedirect purchaser's suit will be its only liability a direct purchaseritselfhas
leverage in that situation because it knows that the defendant cannot assert a pass-on defense at the
trial. Since settlements avoid lawsuits that thereby do not congest the courts, they should generally be
encouraged. Yet this particular hope is full of hidden inequities and misconceptions. Potential
antitrust Niolators will be deterred from any illegal conduct only to the extent that potential risks of
detection outweigh potential benefits from the contemplated actih ity. Sce Wheeler. ,ntitrust Treble-
Damage Actions: Do 7he
" 
Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1321 (1973). Thus. to the extent that a
defendant will be able to coerce a direct purchaser into a smallsettlement. perhaps by relying onjural or
judicial antipathy to direct purchaser windfall, deterrence is not achieved.
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major antitrust actions in recent years 121 indicates that direct purchasers
played only minor roles; had Illinois Brick been applicable, the ultimate
disgorgement from the defendants in each case would have been reduced
or eliminated. In In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, for example, only a
handful of the direct purchaser contractors brought suit against the
defendants. 22 Similarly, the Second Circuit in In re Master Key Antitrust
Litigation, in dismissing an appeal from an order permitting a class of
indirect purchasers to maintain their action as a class action, deflated the
defendants' contention that they would face the threat of multiple liability
if the indirect purchasers were permitted to continue the suit: "[l]t may be
pointed out here that no distributors or general contractors have come
forward to file suit, even if at this late date they could do so under [the four
year statute of limitations]."'12 3
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. 24 affords a final example. The
defendants made a settlement offer of $100,000,000 to states, wholesaler-
retailers, and individual consumers. Notices of the pending settlement
were sent to 55,000 members of the wholesaler-retailer class. Only4100 of
these direct purchasers filed claims; ultimately only three percent of the
settlement fund was allocated to that section of the class.' Moreover,
1500 wholesaler-retailers specifically excluded themselves from the class.
One indignant druggist from Wisconsin wrote that
[a]ny pharmacy claiming damages is, in my opinion, guilty of lying. All
pharmacies base their retail prices for drugs on their costs, either using a fixed
percentage or a professional fee. Either way, they do not suffer damages due
to higher wholesale costs of these drugs. If anyone has a complaint, it would
be the individual consumer, not the pharmacists."
121. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th C0. cert. dhcnied. 415 US, 919
(1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 TRADE CAS. 74.680 (D. Conn, 1973). api'cal
dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975); West Virginia v. Chas. Pliter & Co", 314 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
122. 487 F.2d 191. 198 (9th Cir.). cert. denietl 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
123. 528 F.2d 5. 12 n. II (2d Cir. 1975).
124. West Virginiav. Chas. Pfizer & Co.. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.I).N.Y. 1970). all 'd,440 I 2d 10379
(2d Cir.), cert. deniedt 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
125. M. at 744, 746.
126. M. In addition, the Executive Director of the American Pharmaceutical Association
circulated a letter among the wholesaler-retailers that "urged pharmacits not to submit claim% against
the settlement funds unless actual damage can be demonstrated" and that stated that "ad% erse public
reaction could well result ifpharmacists obtain a share of the settlement lunds and do not pass amounts
received on to patients." Id. at 726.
This twist illustrates another problem with placing the important burden of monitoring comtpeti-
tive behavior in the sole hands of direct purchasers. It might be argued that direct purchaset %%ho
refuse to sue under a direct-purchaser-only rule will have to answer to their stockholders. While this
may be true in some instances, the argument, as West Virginia v. Chs, Pizer & Co. demonstrates,
has weaknesses. For instance, it applies only to direct purchaser corporations. In addition, when no
criminal action has been brought exposing the illegal conduct and wher the direct purchaser is able to
keep the fact of the violation hidden, the injury will go unredressed. When the management ol the
direct purchaser corporation wishes to conceal the fact of the violation 'rom its stockholders for some




These three developments indicate that direct purchasers may not be
the mainstays in the private enforcement of the antitrust laws. The
Congress must determine how important direct purchaser suits actually
have been in the past. Unfortunately, current research has produced
inconclusive results. Perhaps the largest study undertaken so far has been
by Milton Handler and Michael Blechman.' 27  Handler and Blechman
examined Commerce Clearing House Reports from 1971 through 1976 to
discern what types of civil and criminal suits had been brought by the
Department of Justice. Their thesis and conclusion was that most price
fixing and other antitrust violations affected individual consumers only
indirectly.
Their study, however, does not focus on the particular issues in-
volved here and is therefore of limited utility.1 29 There are two problems
with the study. First, it concerned only Department of Justice civil and
criminal cases; private actions were not examined.130 Second, the stated
purpose of the study was to bolster the authors' opposition to the creation
of the parens patriae mechanism,131 a procedural device designed to
facilitate recovery by consumers who had been injured132 by a violation of
the Sherman Act. Congress will necessarily have broader concerns when
it considers anti-Illinois Brick legislation. Such legislation would not
merely favor the everyday consumer of goods but instead broadly confer a
127. Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer hIterest: 77Te Fallacy ofParens Patriae
anda Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976).
128. Handler and Blechman's compilation showed that only45 out ofthe 346 alleged price fixing
conspiracies affected consumers directly, other violations had varying degrees of indirect impact on
consumers. Id. at 636.
129. Handler and Blechman presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 7. 1978 a
pilot study that does consider more carefully the indirect purchaser action under § 4. thus rem-
edying the shortcomings of their earlier study. 859 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6
(April 13, 1978). Handler and Blechman concluded from their study of 116 pri% ate actions that 69 of
those cases concerned buyers or sellers ofgoods or services: of those 69 cases, only three %%ere instituted
by indirect purchasers. Id. at A-6. Even the validity of this study. ho%%eser. %%as questioned.
Kenneth Reed. Assistant Attorney General for the State of Arizona, pointed out in testimony belore
the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 17. 1978, that the new Handler and Blechman study relied on
cases brought in the Southern District of New York: the court sitting in that district has been
traditionally unreceptive to indirect purchaser suits. 860 ANTITRtST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-S
(April 20, 1978). Cf. note 132 supra (discussing a study by Daniel Berger on pass-on cases reported
since 1960).
130. The tuo authors argued that the study was nevertheless an accurate reflection of pritate
litigation, relying on the assumption that § 4 litigation tends to follow in the %vake of successlul
government prosecution. Id. at 634 n.42. This generally occurs, they contended. because a
determination of the violation in the criminal suit need not be re-litigated in private actions. making
these latter actions easier to bring. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). Their assumptions. ho%%Cser. are based
on 1961-1963 figures. Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield has noted that prisateantitrust
cases filed in recent years in the district courts have outnumbered government suits by a factor ofmore
than ten to one. Senate Hearings at 18 (testimony of John H. Shenefield).
131. Parens patriae is a statutory creation that permits the attorney general of each state to sue
on behalf of the natural citi7ens of that state for injuries received by the citiiens as a result of antitrust
violations. The parens patriae device was part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976. Pub. L. No.94-435.90 Stat. 1383. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(1976).
132. The parens patriae device cannot be utilized to recover business-related injury. Id.
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right of action to any indirect purchaser, either private citizen or business
entity, who has dealt on an indirect basis with the violator.'
The Illinois Brick majority concluded that the complexity introduced
into antitrust litigation by indirect purchaser suits t34 would reduce the
direct purchaser's incentive to sue,' 5 thereby frustrating the effectiveness
of the private action. The Court's position, however, is unpersuasive.
During the period between Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, five of six
courts of appeals that considered the validity of indirect purchaser suits,"3 6
as well as practitioners, 37  the Congress, 38  and even businessmen
133. It is interesting to compare with the Handler and Blechman article a letter written by Daniel
Berger to the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Senate learings at 264, Berger
had compiled a list of pass-on cases reported since 1960. His identification of 59 such cases broke
down in the following manner: (a) 23 cases involved both direct and iidirect purchasers. (b) 21 cases
involved only direct purchasers; (c) 15 cases involved only indirect purchasers. This admittedly
tentative study indicates that 60% of the reported pass-on cases since 1960 involved indirect purchasers
in some manner.
134. It is uncertain to what extent the Illinois Brick majority viewed this complexity as a burden
on the direct purchaser or as a burden on judicial resources. Early in the opinion, the majority noted:
The principal basis for the decision in Hanover Shoe was the Court's perception of tie
uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing price and output decisions "in the real economic
world" . . . and of the costs to the judicial system and the efficient enforcement of the
antitrust laws of attempting to reconstruct those decisions in the courtroom,
431 U.S. at 731-32 (emphasis added). Yet later the Court commented:
The concern in Hanover Shoe for the complexity that would be introduced into treble-
damage suits if pass-on theories were permitted was closely related to the Court's concern for
the reduction in the effectiveness of those suits if brought by indirect purchasers with a smaller
stake in the outcome than that of direct purchasers suing for the full amount of the
overcharge. . . .The combination of increasing the costs and diffusing the benefits of
bringing a treble-damage action could seriously impair this important weapon of antitrust
enforcement.
Id. at 745. To the extent that the Court viewed the complexity as a burden on the direct purchaser. the
Congress must assure itself that the various issues raised in the text abdve can be satisfactorily
answered. For a discussion of the judicial resources argument, see note 155 and accompanying text
infra.
135. 431 U.S. at745.
136. Accord, Illinois v. Bristol Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276. 1277-78 (D.C. Cir, 1972) (dictum);
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.). cert. denid. 404 U.S. 871 (197 1). Yoder
Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1374 n.27 (5?h Cir. 1976). (crt. denied, 42)
U.S. 1094 (1977) (dictum); Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir, 1976). rev'd s al nont.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); In re Western Liquid A.phalt Cases. 487 F.2d 191 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). Contra. Mangano v. American Radiatorand Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971). In addition, two othe- circuits considering tile issue
prior to Hanover Shoe permitted plaintiffs to demonstrate pass-on. South Carolina Council of Milk
Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S, 934 (1966); Armeo Steel
Corp. v. North Dakota. 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967).
137. See, e.g., Senate Hearings at 32 (testimony of Robert 0. Vaughan).
138. The Senate Report accompanying the parens patriae legislation notes in part:
The economic burden of many antitrust violations is borne, in large measure, by tile
consumer in the form of higher prices for his goods and services, This is especially true of
such common and widespread practices as price-fixing, which usually results in higher prices
for the consumer, regardless of the level in the chain of distribution at which the violation
occurs. All of these violations are likely to cause injuries to consumers, whether by higher
prices, by illegal limitations of consumer choice, or by illegal withholding of goods and
services. . . .[The parens patriae legislation] rejects the rationale and result [of tile
decisions denying offensive pass on] and is patterned after such innovative decisions as In re
Western Liquid Asphalt cases, In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation. State ot Illiolt
v. Ampress Brick Company . . . . and West Virginia v. Charles Pfiier and Company,
S. REP. No. 94-803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-43 (1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
1978] ILLINOIS BRICK
themselves139 agreed that Hanover Shoe had not affected their validity.
Yet few had contended that such indirect purchaser suits would either
reduce the incentive of the direct purchaser to sue or frustrate the
effectiveness of the antitrust laws.140  The majority in Illinois Brick, on the
other hand, felt that a direct purchaser should not be forced to guess
whether the indirect purchaser will elect to sue. Although there is
undeniably a grey area within which the direct purchaser honestly cannot
be certain of the indirect purchaser's intentions,' 41 the majority's approach
invites a further question: If the direct purchaser, faced with uncertainty,
decides not to sue, might the indirect purchaser sue?
This latter question illustrates that problems still exist in determining
the most likely plaintiff in a private treble damage action. Precedent does
indicate a willingness by the indirect purchaser to bring major actions;
there does not appear to be any evidence that direct purchasers have been
deterred as a result. 142  The claims of the indirect purchaser may be
substantial; without recourse to the federal courts, many will suffer severe
financial loss. This Note has indicated that some of the claims heretofore
brought by indirect purchasers have not presented the insuperable
difficulties envisioned by the Illinois Brick majority. This writer urges
the Congress, therefore, to explore further the important question of who
will sue. 143
139. Former Senator Hugh Scott, one of the co-sponsors of the Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, noted that the opponents ofparenspatriae would not have fought so hard against its passage had
they not perceived its application to indirect purchaser suits. SenateHearingsat6.
140. During the Senate hearings on S. 1874 there did appear to be some minor concern on this
point. Neil Bernstein felt that fewer suits would result: direct purchasers would become discouraged
and indirect purchasers would not take up the slack. Senate Hearings at 197-98.
141. Currently, a direct purchasercan. and undoubtedly does, take advantage ofeertain realities
in antitrust litigation to appraise its situation. One must first recall that the stakes in an antitrust suit
are quite high-not only does the plaintiff, if successful, recover litigation costs, but it also recovers
three times damages. Also, a direct purchaser could avail itself of the relatively short statute of
limitations (four years) to ride out the indirect purchaser;, considering the length of discovery in a
typical antitrust suit, the chances of an indirect purchaser appearing late in the trial to deprive the
plaintiff of a portion of its recovery are small. Finally, the direct purchaser. if it keeps good business
records, is in the best possible position to analyze its position. The problems that the Illinois Brick
Court foresaw may simply work themselves out in the individual case as each party surveys its position.
142. There are very real reasons, on the other hand, why direct purchasers would be reluctant to
sue their manufacturers or distributors. They may not want to disrupt their sole source ofsupply or
they may be on friendly terms with the defendant. Some direct purchasers. furthermore, might feel a
certain moral dishonesty in suing for damages that have been passed on to indirect purchasers. Others
might have little incentive to sue if they have been able to pass on the overcharge, being unwilling to
undertake the risks and high costs of litigation. Still others might be reluctant to open their files to
discovery, an event certain to occur during the pretrial development ofa lawsuit. Finally. afew may
have reasons that actually run contrary to the purpose of the antitrust laws. Iftheyareable to pass on
the costs, they also may be able to charge an added profit themselves; therefore, they have no reason to
upset the applecart.
143. The congressional hearings to date do indicate a legislative concern about the problem.
See, e.g., Senate Hearings at 66 (testimony of Michael Blechman); id. at 79 (testimony of Frederick M.
Rowe). id. at 189 (testimony of Neil Bernstein); id. at 131 (testimony of Earl Pollack).
At the Senate hearings on S. 1874 held in September 1977, district court Judges Real and Joiner
reached interesting conclusions. Judge Real's comment was the most provocative:
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B. Paring the Number of Litigants-Standing
1. A Theoretical Solution
The Congress must consider whether it is advisable to permit every
indirect purchaser in a chain to sue regardless of its remoteness from the
violation or whether the resulting complications would so vitiate the treble
damage action that only a handful of plaintiffs would ever appear to strip
the defendant of its illegal profit. To agree with Justice White that a rule
permitting all indirect purchasers to maintain suit "would transform treble-
damage actions into massive multiparty litigations involving many levels
of distribution and including large classes of ultimate consumers remote
from the defendant"' 44 is not necessarily to conclude that a direct-
purchaser-only rule is inevitable. 45  The approach outlined below at-
tempts to pare the number of plaintiffs. It recognizes that in any
particular antitrust violation certain groups of potential plaintiffs are
likely to have borne substantial portions of the overcharge 4 and that the
dual policies of deterrence and compensation that undergird the treble
damage provision are best served by a limiting rule that would admit only
such plaintiffs. It is true that any attempt to permit some plaintiffs to sue
while excluding others can result in claim-ranking. Nevertheless, an
approach such as that suggested below, although difficult to implement,
may be preferable to one that aggregates recovery in the direct purchaser
and is therefore arbitrary in some cases.
Section 4 must be capped to limit the action to those parties most
directly affected by the violation; injuries collateral to that main impact
I can visualize that there would be reluctance in many cases for the direct purchasers to bring
an action for violation of the antitrust laws. I think it may be evident from the fact that
generally-and generalizations are very bad-the way a direct purchaser brings an action for
violations of the antitrust laws is generally in answer to a suit by the supplier for a bill that Is
unpaid.
Senate Hearings at 100. But see the astonishment expressed at this remark by Earl Pollack in his own
testimony: "I am sure that Judge Real may reconsider and agree with me that the overwhelming bulk ol
private antitrust enforcement, even since the enactment of the Clayto 1 Act. has been through actions
brought by direct purchasers. I say that unequivocally." I. at 131.
Judge Joiner's remarks, although more tempered than Judge Real's, also indicate uncertainly
about the question:
I tried to look back at the cases involving antitrust violations which have come belore
me, and I think in all the eases which have come before me direct purchasers have been
involved in one way or another ....
I must tell you that about half of these cases were cases in which the antitrust claim was
made by way of defense to another claim which was made againt the direct purchaser, so I
think that cannot count too heavily because it becomes defensive at that point. However. I
have not found in the history of the cases which have been befor.- me that direct purchasers
were in any way inhibited in suing.
Senate Hearings at 155-56.
144. 431 U.S. at 740.
145. See Section lV(A) supra.
146. See Section IV(C) infra.
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should not be recognized by the courts. Indeed, there is no reason why a
standing doctrine, properly defined, cannot be developed to make the
delimitation required in pass-on cases. The problem in the past has been a
judicial use of the standing doctrine as a diversion from the proper inquiry
of whether damages could ever be proved.
1 47
The development of a new standing doctrine in the pass-on context
must be consistent with the policies that standing is meant to serve. 
14s
This standing doctrine must also recognize the practicalities of the huge
antitrust lawsuit. Few would argue, for instance, that all of the taxpayers
of the State of Illinois, who ultimately may have borne the overcharge on
the bricks in Illinois Brick, should be able to maintain an action. The
sheer size of the usual antitrust case and its attendant costs to the litigants
and the court system suggest the need for a cut-off point. Thus, to
recognize the claims of every Illinois taxpayer may well be fruitless because
the time and expense far outweigh the expected return. Yet these concerns
should not prevent adjudication of the claims of the state itself, especially
when the evidence indicates the occurrence of a pass-on. 149  It is
therefore desirable in determining the proper plaintiffs to distinguish
those purchasers in the chain who may have absorbed substantial portions
of the overcharge and who thus present the greatest possibility of deter-
mining damages.
A statute cannot realistically draw a distinct line between permissible
and impermissible claims. Legislation should instead indicate the desire
of the Congress that section 4 benefit direct purchasers and a limited
number of indirect purchasers. It should provide a flexible structure that
the courts can apply to implement the congressional airective.
This writer argues that any solution must create a structure that would
ensure the plaintiffs in the basic chain"'5 a section 4 cause of action; as
was indicated in Section II(A), these purchasers present the easiest cases to
prove. This approach would encourage the plaintiffs in the basic chain to
act vigilantly as private attorneys general. In addition, it would place any
potential violator on notice of the possibility of suit by more than one
party.
A purchaser outside the basic chain should not automatically be
denied standing. Instead, a threshold question should be whether any
purchaser within the basic chain has yet sued. If none has sued, then
147. See Section lll(A) supra.
148. A thorough analysis of the reasons and policies for a standing doctrine is in Berger &
Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 Y. LE L. J. 809(1977). Theauthors
stress three major policies militating in favor of a standing doctrine-fear ofduplicati\ c recoveries. fear
of ruinous liability, and concern with burdening the judiciary with long and complex litigation. hat
850-57.
149. See Section IV(C) infra.
150. For this writer's definition of "basic chain," see Section 1(A) supra.
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standing should be granted as a matter of law'' to assure that a violator
does not escape unscathed. 52 Thus, in Hanover Shoe, if the manufacturer
of the shoes had not sued the manufacturer of the shoe machinery, a group
of buyers should have been permitted to institute a class action.
Finally, the court should not immediately dismiss an outsider's suit
even if a plaintiff within the basic chain has sued. The court should instead
make a preliminary inquiry to determine whether this potential plaintiff
can present a substantial claim. The purchaser outside the chain should
be required to present evidence indicating that the particular market in
which the violation occurred made it likely that a significant amount of the
overcharge had been passed on to it.153 In effect, the outsider would have
to assure the court that the deterrent and compensatory policies of the
treble damage provision would be fostered by the lawsuit. This Note
previously posited that a standing doctrine should not be used when the
issue concerns difficulties in damage calculation. 54 The suggestions now
urged are not contradictory since they would not require the court to
determine whether damages were speculative but rather to determine
whether administrative costs to litigants and the court system militate
against any further consideration of a particular plaintiff's action.'"
2. Congressional Responses,
The two bills before the Congress have attempted to resolve the
question whether any limitation should be placed upon the number of
indirect purchasers permitted to sue. These resolutions are now considered
in light of the solution suggested above.
a. S. 1874. The Senate bill contains no express substantive provi-
sion that would limit standing to certain parties in the chain. The only
discussion appears in the "Findings and Purposes" portion of the bill
which states, in part, that one of the purposes of S. 1874 is "to reserve to the
courts the applications and revision of existing principles of remoteness,
151. It is unlikely, at least under the target area test of standing, that an indirect purchaser in a
chain could otherwise be denied standing. Seenote95supra.
152. It is possible that a direct purchaser or another indirect purchaser higher in the chain might
assert an action subsequent to the commencement of an action by a purchaser lower in the chain. At
the time the indirect purchaser outside the basic chain commences its suit, however, there is no
certainty that any other person will either commence a suit or at least intervene; out of considerations
of equity, therefore, the initial plaintiffought to be permitted to continue in the action and present its
damage claim.
153. Thus, in Illinois Brick the plaintiff state, although outside the basic chain (the brick had
undergone a transformation before it reached the state) should be perm tted to demonstrate the type of
market in which it was dealing. See note 69 and accompanying text suvra.
154. See Section Ill(A) supra.
155. The approach suggested in the foregoing text has been mentioned in the literature as one
that should be considered in antitrust standing questions generally. Set Sherman, Antitrust Standing:
From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 374,403 (1976). But see Berger& Bernstein.tqra note
148, at 857 ("In any event, given the inequities and impracticalities of balancing substantive claims




target area, and proximate causation which have been applied to limit the
persons who can recover for antitrust violations."
' 16
It is regrettable that the Senate has not provided in S. 1874 specific
guidance that would aid the courts to develop a standing doctrine in the
pass-on context. To be sure, the substantive provision in the bill that "the
fact that a person or the United States has not dealt directly with the
defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery"' 5 7 should at least
preclude a court from resorting to a restrictive direct injury test of standing
and force it to make additional policy choices. This Note, however, has
already discussed the problems that the circuits have experienced in their
attempt to articulate adequately the policies that should be considered
when standing is implicated.158 The Senate should include in S. 1874 a
provision outlining the types of inquiries that a court should make when
the standing of indirect purchasers is at issue; the theoretical solution
sketched above provides a basis.
b. H.R. 11942. The House bill articulates three standing limita-
tions:' 59 (1) the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller; (2) the purchaser or
seller must be in the chain of manufacture, production, 6 or distribution;
and (3) the purchaser or seller must be the recipient of an overcharge or
undercharge. 161
The courts would first be required to determine whether the plaintiff
was a "purchaser" or "seller."' 62  The effect of the purchaser-seller
156. S. 1874, § 2(b) (6). See note 58 supra.
157. S. 1874, § 3. See rate 58 supra. The Senate Report explains:
The bill does, however, explicitly reject any rule of law-whether based on standing or
otherwise-which would deny recovery based on a test of whether the plaintiff has dealt
directly with (or is "in privity") with the defendant. In this sense the legislation goes beyond
the stated holding in Illinois Brick-which in footnote 7 the Court expressly said was not
based on consideration of standing-to provide that whatever labels are used. recoveryshall
not be denied an antitrust plaintiff because the plaintiff has not dealt directly with the
defendant.
SENATE REPORT at 24. Especially when considered in light of § 2(b) (6) of the bill, this excerpt is
confusing. Both the excerpt and § 3 of the bill appear to preclude the judiciary from resorting to a
standing doctrine to bar indirect purchasers, regardless of their proximity, from bringing suit. More
likely, however, § 2(b) (6) probably should be read to override the other provisions on this issue and to
permit a court to continue to utilize a direct injury test of standing if that test is generallyapplied. See
also SENATE REPORT at 9.
158. See Section Ill(A) supra.
159. Seenote61 supra.
160. The House Report indicates the necessity for the inclusion of the word "production": "The
word 'production' has been added because some goods, for example, cattle, wheat, and oil are not
,manufactured' in the ordinary sense of that word. Rather, they are 'produced.' Like all other
commerce covered by the antitrust laws, they are covered by this bill." HoUsE REPORT at 14-15.
161. This provision is, in effect, a limitation on the types of damages for %%hieh an indirect
purchaser can sue and, accordingly, will be discussed in Section IV (C) infra.
162. The House Report explains:
A "purchaser" or"seller" . . . means anyone who acquires orsells a property interest in
return for valuable consideration. Leases and subleases at conspiratorially inflated prices
are accordingly covered. The status and purpose of the purchaser-w hether commercial or
noncommercial-are irrelevant. The gravamen of the action is simply that the purchaser has
paid an illegally inflated price. It does not matter whether the purchaser is a consumer or
business entity. When a consumer pays more by reason ofan antitrust iolation. he is injured
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limitation is to focus the court's attention on the chain; indirect injuries
and other injuries occurring to persons outside the chain, such as land-
lords, creditors, or stockholders, would be excluded.
1 63
The most important of the three standing limitations in the bill is the
"in the chain" limitation. The House Judiciary Committee, refusing to
place a rigid interpretation on the phrase, creates a term of art capable of
judicial evolution:
The committee recognizes that inherent limitations in the judicial fact-
finding process will make proof of pass-on simply impossible in some cases.
But rather than adopt an arbitrary "first-purchaser-only" rule, the commit-
tee intends that the courts decide who is "in the chain" and who can prove
injury, on a flexible and factually sound basis. Hence, the "in the chain"
phrase is both an authorization and a limitation on the right to prove pass-
on. 164
Significantly, the Committee states that it is rejecting "an arbitrary
limitation of those who can sue-that is, those who are 'in the chain'-to
purchasers or sellers who purchase or sell goods in the same form as they
were sold or purchased by the violator."'' 65 The "in the chain" requirement
as articulated by the House provides a practical starting point for limiting
the number of indirect purchasers who can sue under section 4. Unfortu-
nately, the House bill fails to provide further guidance and therefore would
permit courts to fall back on their traditional standing rules. The
suggestion of this Note, that the court select a core of plaintiffs and add
further plaintiffs who appear to have absorbed substantial portions of the
overcharge, could supply the guidance that the House bill lacks.
C. Determination of Damages
1. The Necessity of Adopting the Bigelow Approach
The inequity of Illinois Brick lies in the majority's refusal to recognize
that all indirect purchaser claims do not present like degrees of difficulty in
determining damages. This inequity is made even more apparent when
in his "property," and may prove his injury as an indirect purch. ser under this bill or as it
direct purchaser under Section 4. 4A. or 4C.
HousE REPORT at 15.
163. The purchaser-seller limitation does not present any innovations, but merely codifies tile
current case law of antitrust standing. It is difficult, therefore, to understand the position of
Representatives Wiggins. Railsback, Butler, Moorhead, Kindness, and Sawyer. who dissented from
H.R. 11942. They criticized the limitation: "This practical exclusion may facilitate judicial adminis-
tration, but it does not fulfill the promises made that the bill will permit the injured to recover," Ilotsm
REPORT at 60. Since under traditional standing doctrines, indirectly injured persons such as creditors,
landlords, stockholders, or corporate employees cannot recover, it is difficult to understand the
significance of the dissenters' point.
164. HOUSE REPORT at 17.
165. Id. at 18-19. But this rejection should not preclude the courts from making a realistic
evaluation of the market before them: "Nevertheless, in some cases, courts should end "the chain" at
the point where the overcharged items is [sic) transformed into something else. But this decision




Illinois Brick is viewed in light of the Supreme Court's own pronounce-
ments on the proper standards of proof for treble damages actions. Once
an antitrust plaintiff has demonstrated the fact of some damage to it under
the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard, the series of
Supreme Court cases culminating in Bigelow v. R. K. 0. Pictures, Inc. 66
permits the plaintiff to prove the amount of those damages suffered under a
standard of proof weaker than the traditional standard. This writer
previously argued167 that these Supreme Court cases should be read to
permit the antitrust plaintiff to proceed with the best available evidence
and to authorize the courts to accept damage calculations whenever based
on a reasonable theory. The development of a solution to the Supreme
Court's concern about the supposed difficulties of proving pass-on
must incorporate the policy of the earlier cases.
The argument that the Bigelow approach must be applied to pass-on
cases is strengthened by the economic realities of an antitrust violation. A
violation often occurs in a market in which demand for the product is
highly inelastic, since the violator's chances of success are greater in such
circumstances. 68  This is true for two reasons. First, the violator must
operate in a market in which its higher prices will not result in a significant
drop in sales. 169 Second, a direct purchaser receiving an overcharge is able
to pass it on to an indirect purchaser; indeed, assuming that the direct
purchaser operates on a cost percentage basis, its profit may even increase
as a result of the violation. The direct purchaser's incentive to sue the
violator therefore weakens. Consequently, whenever the relevant market
is highly demand inelastic, substantial portions of the overcharge can be
passed down the chain.
70
The litigated cases demonstrate that the injured party in a chain of
manufacture or distribution is frequently an indirect purchaser. For
example, an economist for the plaintiff in the Master Key litigation
concluded in an affidavit:
Based on the preceding, we may infer that any overcharges paid for
finished hardware components by general contractors are fully reflected in
their bids on buildings for the State of Illinois. Moreover, because the
percentage markup applied to costs by general contractors in calculating their
bids are [sic] unaffected by the price of finished hardware, the full finished
hardware overcharge is passed on to the State of Illinois plus the contractor's
percentage markup on the overcharge. In other words, if this percentage
166. 327 U.S. 251 (1946). The earlier cases are Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927), and Story Parchment Paper Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co..
282 U.S. 555 (1931). See Section Ill(B) supra.
167. See Section Il(B) supra.
168. House Hearings at 199 (testimony of Peter Max). Seegenerally Schaefer, supra note 65.
169. A price fixer or other antitrust violator cannot profit in a market in \ hich demand is elastic.
In such a market, by definition, substitute products become more attractive uhenever the price of the
principal product increases beyond a certain point.
170. Schaefer, supra note 65, at 897.
1978]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
markup were 10 percent, for each $1 that the conspiracy increases prices to
general contractors, the State of Illinois would pay an extra $1.10.
Additionally, because finished hardware components are essential parts
of a building and represent a relatively small part of the total cost of a
building, the demand for these components is very inclastic, i.e., the volume
of purchases are [sic] not affected by price. When demand is very inelastic,
increases in costs due to an overcharge will be passed on in full.'"'
In the Gypsum cases, the district court noted a similar result:
Total demand for gypsum wallboard is not materially influenced by
changes in the current price of gypsum wallboard since the cost of wallboard
is a relatively small element in the total cost of a residential or commercial
structure. The cost of gypsum wallboard used in the construction of an
average sized house calculated at approximate 1969 published prices in the
San Francisco Bay Area is $382. This compares with the total estimated
construction cost of an average house for 1968 of $18,000 (not including the
cost of the land, builder's profit or financing cost). Otherwise stated, the cost
of wallboard amounts to only about 2 per cent of the total construction of a
typical house. As a consequence, the demand for such wallboard is inelastic
to price and even substantial changes in gypsum wallboard prices are not
likely to change the quantity consumed.
72
It is thus imierative that the Congress structure a statute that would
facilitate the assertion of claims by indirect purchasers. It is not sufficient
to assert, as the Supreme Court did in Illinois Brick, that courts cannot
reconstruct in the courtroom the features of a perfectly competitive
market.11 3 Similar objections could be directed at the approach taken in
most antitrust treble damage actions. Nevertheless, in the past the Court
has surmounted such obstacles in order to promote the dual goals of the
treble damage action.
174
The legacy of Supreme Court decisions establishing proof require-
ments for the plaintiff in treble damage actions should form the basis for an
approach that would permit each plaintiff in the chain of manufacture or
distribution to present the best possible evidence in its possession., 75 The
desideratum must be to permit the trial court to survey the market
structure in the particular case before it; the boundaries of the inquiry
should be the individual court's perception of the strain on the judicial
171. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 TRADE CAS, 74.680 at 94.981 (D. Conn.
1973) (quoting affidavit of William F. Mueller).
172. Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295.300 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Even the
Illinois Brick majority admitted that "[flirms in many sectors of the economy rely to an extent on cost-
based rules of thumb in setting prices." 431 U.S. at 744. That the majority continued, adding that
"[t]hese rules are not adhered to rigidly" and that "the extent of the markup (or the allocation of costs)
is varied to reflect market conditions" does not destroy the utility of the initial statement.
173. 431 U.S. at 741-45.
174. See Section Ill(B) supra.
175. When trials have been consolidated or parties have intervened, each plaintiff's information
and records would be available to the entire group, thus creating an ad versarial environment among




system as well as its recognition that not every person who has suffered a
minor injury can be permitted to recover.
A court's apportionment of the damages among the plaintiffs will
undoubtedly be imprecise. At the same time, it must be emphasized that
the trebling feature of the section 4 action compensates to an extent for
that imprecision. 176  An approach such as that suggested here would
therefore permit the courts to make a reasonable estimate of the pecuniary
loss suffered by each member of the chain. Some have criticized the treble
damage action, contending that jural fears of awarding a windfall can lead
to a refusal to disgorge the whole of the defendant's illegal profit."' This
fear may disappear, at least in chain of distribution cases, when the jury
knows that its verdict will be apportioned in a more equitable manner.
2. S. 1874, H.R. 11942
The House committees have shown greater creativity in developing a
solution to the damages problem than have the Senate committees. Even
though innovative and constructive suggestions were made in the Senate
hearings on S. 1874,178 the resulting Senate bill contains no substantive
provisions that would overcome the concerns of the Supreme Court and
guide the judicial efforts to measure damages.
The House committees have also not been receptive to all the inno-
vative suggestions made during the hearings. 79 Nevertheless, the resulting
176. Phillip Areeda commented in his testimony before the House Monopolies Subcommittee
that "there is too much concern about relentlessly trying to recover every penny that the defendant may
have gained from his wrongdoing. Trebling makes up for missing some damages here." House
Hearings at 79-80.
177. See Note, supra note 102, at 1569. After the offensive pass-on theories asserted in the
homeowner and public bodies actions in ,fangano had been rejected on the basis of Hanover Shoe. see
notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra, the district court approved a settlement of the class action
that had been brought by various contractors. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corp., 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Affirming this settlement on appeal
in the face ofcontentions that the settlement was insufficient, the Third Circuit noted that "the claims of
this class were minimized by the probability that overcharges made upon them w'ere passed on to their
customers." Ace Heating and Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co,, 453 F.2d 30, 34(3d Cir. 1971). Thus. the
indirect purchasers were precluded from maintaining actions while the direct purchasers were
chastized for being too greedy in their requests. A direct-purchaser-only rule would perpetuate this
attitude. Defendants will be understandably irritated in having to settle with plaintiffs i ho were not
injured, juries will be reluctant to force defendants to disgorge the full overcharge, and courts are likely
to take the attitude of the Third Circuit.
178. For example, Richard Turner, the attorney general for the State of Iowa suggested at the
Senate hearings that the legislation might create a presumption that the overcharge has been passed on
to the last purchaser in the chain, rebuttable only by a preponderance ol the evidence. Senate
Hearings at 105. See Note, supra note 64, at 984. The assumption in Turner's suggestion that an
overcharge is passed down the chain reflects the concepts developed earlier concerning the types of
markets in which pass-on is likely to occur. See Section II(A) supra.
179. The staffofthe House Monopolies Subcommittee at one point suggested that the procedure
at the damages stage of the action might be facilitated by the adoption of an initial evidential
presumption that each plaintiff was injured equally; thereafter, the court could shift the percentages
upon consideration of the evidence. 846 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4 (January 12.
1978). It is debatable, however, whether this technique should be adopted at the outset of the
consideration of damages since the evidential presumption would destroy to an extent the clean slate
with which the court should approach the issues. A more satisfactory possibility would be to reserve
the staff's suggestions, permitting a court to apply it in its discretion as a last resort.
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bill does contain at least one useful provision to aid the federal judiciary at
the damages stage. Section 2 of the House bill would permit proof of
damages on a class-wide basis in class actions and 'arenspatriae actions;
the percentage of the total damages thus collected by a member of the class
would equal the ratio of the member's purchases or sales to the purchases
or sales of the class as a whole. 80 This approach should not be subject to
the constitutional objections that have befallen fluid relief'8' and that now
threaten the creativity of the parens patriae device.' 82 Some courts and
writers have found these devices objectionable because they permit
recovery by plaintiffs who have not appeared in court to prove individual
damages. In contradistinction, under the House bill, each plaintiff would
still be required to appear in court to prove damage to itself, albeit by
documenting its purchases.1
83
One additional provision in the House bill that affects damage
calculation deserves mention: Indirect purchasers may recover only for the
initial overcharge exacted by the defendant from the direct purchaser.
Subsequent boosts in the price of a product within the chain provoked by
the defendant's illegal overcharge are not recoverable. This provision
would be important, for example, when a member of the chain sets its
selling price as a percentage of cost. In that case, the illegal overcharge
becomes incorporated into the member's cost and yields both additional
profit for the member and additional cost for purchasers down the chain.
Under the House bill, the additional cost to subsequent purchasers, even
though proximately caused by the initial overcharge, could not be recov-
ered.
This limitation on recovery has a further effect, perhaps unnoticed by
"Che House drafters. 84 It was earlier mentioned in this Note' 8 ' that, despite
its ability to pass on part of the overcharge, a member of a chain may have
180. See note 61 supra. The House Report states that the pupose of this provision was to
approve the approach already taken by some circuits with respect to class actions in general.
181. See,e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973). vacatedon other
grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974). crt.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
182. See Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Inprovenents Act of 1976, 77 Cot U, L,
REV. 679, 730 (1977).
183. Some courts have accorded de facto recognition to the legitimacy of the House bill's
approach by permitting the threshold requirement of the fact of some damage to a class member to be
proved in class actions by demonstrating the generalized fact of some damage to the class, Sce In re
Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 1977-1 TRADE CAS. 61.373 at 71,336-37 (N.D, Cal. 1977); In re
Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1975-2 TRADE CAS. 60,648 (2d Cir. 1975); The Master Key court
wrote:
If the appellees establish at the trial for liability that the defendanvs engaged in an unlawful
national conspiracy which had the effect of stabilizing prices abose competitive levels, and
further establish that the appellees were consumers of that product, we would think that the
jury could reasonably conclude that appellants' conduct caused injury to each appellee.
Id. at 94,981 n.1l.
184. The purpose of the provision, according to the House Report. was to cover those
cases discussed in the text above that involve percentage-of-cost contracts, Houst, Rtl'oRT at 16,
185. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
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lost profits on additional sales it could have made but for the higher prices
that a defendant's illegal activity forced it to charge. The House provision
would apparently preclude a purchaser from recovering these lost prof-
its.116 This writer views this feature of the House bill as a necessary
compromise that places realistic limits upon the inquiries required of a
court.
D. The Problem of Multiple Liability:
Should Hanover Shoe Be Reversed?
An important question remains to be considered: What should be the
proper role of the Hanover Shoe doctrine?187  Even some who argue in
favor of the indirect purchaser suit admit that a rule that permits offensive
but not defensive pass-on threatens the defendant with serious risks of
multiple liability. 188 Unfortunately, legislation that overrules both Illinois
Brick and Hanover Shoe would permit the defendant to play a shell game
with the various purchasers in the chain. Such an approach could
ultimately permit an adjudicated monopolist to retain a substantial
portion of its ill-gotten gain. It is crucial, therefore, that Hanover Shoe be
retained. If the Congress is convinced that any anti-Illinois Brick legisla-
tion must perforce overrule Hanover Shoe, this writer would urge that the
Congress not overrule Illinois Brick.189 There is, however, another
alternative. The following portion of this Note attempts to demonstrate
186. A court faced with the contention that a plaintiffshould be able to recov-er those lost profits
could independently reach the results advocated in the House bill as a matter of remoteness under an
antitrust standing theory.
187. Hanover Shoe is discussed in Section I(A)(I) supra.
188. Senate Hearings at 53 (testimony of Eleanor Fox), House Hearings at 15 (testimony of
John H. Shenefield).
In his oral testimony before the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Las.
Phillip Areeda indicated one reason why the concern about the prospects of multiple liability 'as
legitimate:
It has been suggested that multiple recoveries have never occurred and are therefore not
really a problem. But I do not take much comfort from that for the follossing reasons: Only in
recent years have the class action techniques, or mounting consumer actions been refined.
And the parens patriae vehicle for bringing consumer actions, perhaps a rather effective
vehicle, is also quite new. At the same time, there is a growing inclination among businesses
themselves to invoke the antitrust laws as plaintiffs. This indicates an increasing likelihood
of middlemen suing, at the same time that the techniques for major actions on behalf of
consumers have become more effective.
That there hasn't been a duplicate recovery problem in prior history of the Sherman Act
thus is not altogether reassuring that there won't be one in the future.
House Hearings at 78.
189. Perry Goldberg testified at the Senate Committee's 1978 hearings that 11anover Shoe must
be retained:
I have to say that the important thing tome is Hanover Shoe. Illinois Brick is something
that appeals to my heart in the sense that I am opposed to Illinois Brick because there is
something wrong with not allowing a person who has been hurt to collect in the courts.
But if I have to choose between my heart and my head, in this case, I %% ill take my head.
My head is Hanover Shoe. Hanover Shoe says: "we are going to get antitrust enforce-
ment" Illinois Brick says: "The wrong guy may collect."
Testimony of Perry Goldberg before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. April 21. 1978. cited in
SENATE REPORT at 6.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that it is possible for the Congress simultaneously to avoid the risks of
multiple liability, 90 retain the salutary results of Hanover Shoe, and
overturn Illinois Brick.
!. The Difficulty of Permitting Defensive Pass-on: The Attempted
Solutions in S. 1874 and H.R. 11942
Both S. 1874 and H.R. 11942 would provide a limited overruling of
Hanover Shoe, although the circumstances under which each bill would
permit the assertion of a pass-on defense are different. An examination of
the two proposed solutions demonstrates the abuse that could occur even
with a limited overruling of Hanover Shoe.
The Senate bill would allow a defendant to demonstrate that a
plaintiff had passed on the overcharge to any party that is itself entitled to
recover treble damages under the antitrust laws.' 91  The Senate report
explained the bill's approach: "[T]he pass-on defense cannot be used where
the overcharge was passed on to persons who themselves would be denied
recovery under either the doctrines of proximate cause or target area,
... or legal bars to recovery."' 92 The Senate Committee intends that the
judiciary permit. the assertion of the pass-on defense "only where it does
not inhibit the private enforcement of the antitrust laws or create a hiatus
in enforcement."' 93
The House version of the anti-Illinois Brick legislation, on the other
hand, uses the "in the chain" concept that it developed for the standing
portion of the bill. H.R. 11942 would permit the defendant to demon-
strate that a plaintiff had passed on the overcharge to another seller or
purchaser "in the chain."' 94 Apparently, the same inquiries that a court
would make to determine whether an indirect purchaser could sue for
treble damages would be made once again at the damages stage of the trial
to determine whether-and to whom-a defendant could demonstrate
pass-on.
The bills differ in at least two significant way;. This Note earlier
indicated that the Senate bill would fail to provide the judiciary with
realistic advice about how the number of indirect purchasers might be
pared; presumably courts were to apply their traditional standing tests. 9
5
190. It is incorrect to argue that defendants must have the benefit of Hanover Shoe to the extent
that plaintiffs have the benefit of Illinois Brick. The plaintiff is the innocent victim ofanticompetitive
conduct, while the defendant, at the damages stage of the proceedings, has already been adiudged
guilty ofviolating the antitrust laws. The proper question is whether the defendant faces the risk that it
will be forced to pay more than once for the same overcharge.
191. S. 1874,§3. See note 58 supra.
192. SENATE REPORT at 6.
193. Id.
194. H.R. 11942, § 2. See note 61 supra. The House bill would p(,rmit anysubsequent plaintiff
to take advantage of this situation by collaterally estopping the defendant on any issues relating to the
amount of damages passed on.
195. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra.
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The House bill, on the other hand, would create a new standing concept
to be applied in the pass-on cases. 196 Therefore, to the extent that H.R.
11942 would require a court to develop for pass-on cases a test that
deviates from its usual standing test, the two bills would differ in the extent
to which Hanover Shoe would be abrogated. The second difference
concerns the extent to which legal bars to recovery that face a potential
plaintiff would affect the ability to assert a pass-on defense. S. 1874 does
not permit the assertion of a pass-on defense when the person allegedly the
recipient of the pass-on is otherwise legally barred from bringing suit. In
contrast, the House bill would not permit the court to determine whether
the person allegedly the recipient of the overcharge is legally barred from
bringing suit (for example, by the statute of limitations) before it permitted
the assertion of defensive pass-on.
An examination of the lengthy excerpt from Hanover Shoe cited
earlier in this Note' 97 indicating the policy reasons for the Supreme Court's
rejection of the pass-on defense illustrates the havoc that even a limited
overruling of Hanover Shoe would wreak. The shell game that would
undoubtedly result in practice would take on new dimensions since the
defendant would be injecting standing inquiries into the damages stage of
an action. Essentially, these portions of S. 1874 and H.R. 11942 would
permit the defendant to demonstrate to the court policy reasons why a
purchaser other than the plaintiff should be considered "in the chain" or
"entitled to sue." Yet it is peculiarly inappropriate to permit a violator of
the antitrust laws to aid the court to develop standing policies that might be
stare decisis in subsequent actions. The possibility exists that a
defendant's arguments will be tainted by its interest in defining a standing
doctrine that would encompass only those plaintiffs unlikely to present the
threat of a suit against it.
This writer believes that other provisions in the House bill, especially
when considered in conjunction with existing procedural devices,
sufficiently protect defendants from the risk of multiple liability; the
congressional committees disagree.' 98 Consequently, this writer suggests
a method that should allay the congressional concerns, and nevertheless
permit the legislative overturning of Illinois Brick.
The suggested approach would be to create, in essence, a new statute
of limitations. The Congress could create authority for the courts to
require the assertion by members of the chain of all claims against an
antitrust violator within a specified period of time after a suit is com-
menced by one of the purchasers; the claims could be asserted in the same
court using Rule 24 intervention '9 or as new actions in separate courts.'60
196. See note 61 supra.
197. See note 114 supra.
198. SENATE REPORT at 6: HousE REPORT at 20.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
260. Cases in different districts could thereafter be consolidated in one district for pretrial
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Persons not appearing within the prescribed period would be barred from
subsequently commencing their own actions. The technique could be
implemented simply, using newspaper notice or perhaps notice in trade
journals. Unfortunately, this approach might possibly foreclose plaintiffs
whose actions did not arise until after the statutory period had run because
their purchases had not yet occurred.20' It is more important, however, to
draft legislation that would retain Hanover Shoe and simultaneously
repudiate Illinois Brick.
V. CONCLUSION
The remedial function of section 4 of the Clayton Act requires that
plaintiffs injured by antitrust violations have access to the courts. In the
past, the access provided by Congress in section 4 had, it was believed,
included the right of plaintiffs indirectly injured by price-fixing violations
or other monopolistic conduct to maintain actions. One salutary effect of
this right was that it furthered the deterrent function of section 4. The
Illinois Brick Court's construction of the "injury" requirement to exclude
the purchaser indirectly injured in a chain of manufacture or distribution
thus not only forecloses what is often the sole opportunity of the indirect
purchaser to recover its pecuniary loss, but also works a major retreat in
antitrust enforcement.
As the congressional committees that are currently drafting anti-
Illinois Brick legislation have discovered, however, simple overruling of
the decision would fail to resolve the difficulties identified by the Supreme
Court. The arguments of the Court can only be rebutted if care is taken to
articulate the problems at issue and weigh the legitimate interests of both
direct and indirect purchasers.
In support of that task, this Note has attempted to untangle the
various strands of law that comprise the knot of pass-on. It has indicated
the special need for Congress to school itself in the policies and law of
antitrust standing as it endeavors to define those indirect purchasers who
should be able to sue. Finally, this Note has suggested that, to provide a
method for calculating the damages of each member of the assembled
proceedings utilizing the Multidistrict Litigation Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(1970 & Supp. V 1976). While
such transfers are ostensibly permitted only for discovery and other pretrial proceedings, 28 LI,S,C, §
1404 can sometimes be relied upon to retain the action in that district. Statutory revision of 28 U!.S. C.
§ 1407 to permit this procedure as a matter of course has been urged in Note, The Judicial Paneland tie
Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1001 (1974).
Section 4 of H.R. 11942 would amend the Multidistrict Act to permit the trial consolidation of any
civil action brought under the Clayton Act. See note 61 supra. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act authorizes this procedure forparenspatriaeactions. Pb, I_ 94-435, § 303.90 Stat,
1396, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(h) (1970 & Supp. 1978). The House bill, therefore, would merely extend
this treatment to § 4 private actions and § 4A actions by the United States,
201. Judge Harold R. Tyler, former district court judge and former Deputy Attorney General of
the United States, testified that a member of the chain might not even receive a good or product that has
been the subject of an antitrust violation until after a suit has been commenced higher up the chain
House Hearings at 160-61.
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group, Congress should hearken back to the policies of the Bigelow
decision and adopt an approach that would ease the burden that the
antitrust plaintiff faces.
The anti-Illinois Brick legislation seems likely to reach the floor of
both Houses in early 1979.202 Close congressional examination of the
measures are necessary if the solutions suggested in S. 1874 and H.R.
11942 are to succeed.
Thomas Demitrack
202. A threatened filibuster by Senator Orrin G. Hatch kept S. 1874 from the Senate floorat the
close of the 95th Congress. 882 ANTiTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-21 (September 28, 1978).
After the close of the session, congressional staffers both in the Senate and House Committees
indicated that new anti-Illinois Brick legislation was being considered. 887 A%TITRUST &TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) A-13 (November 2, 1978).
